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 Documents published by ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and Qualification, 
belong to one of the following 3 types: 
 
 
Type 1 — Consensus Document  
A consensus document contains harmonised principles, methodologies, approaches and 
procedures, and stresses the degree of harmonisation on the subject among ENIQ 
members. 
 
 
Type 2 — Position/Discussion Document 
A position/discussion document may contain compilations of ideas, expressions of opinion, 
reviews of practices, or conclusions and recommendations from technical projects.  
 
 
Type 3 — Technical Report 
A technical report is a document containing results of investigations, compilations of data, 
reviews and procedures without expressing any specific opinion or valuation on behalf of 
ENIQ. 
 
 
 
 
 
This document “ENIQ Technical Report: Link between Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection 
and Inspection Qualification” (ENIQ Report No 36) is a Type 3 document. 
 
 
  
 FOREWORD 
This report describes the work performed and presents the results from the group 
sponsored project “Link Between Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection and Inspection 
Qualification”. The project was coordinated by Doosan Babcock with a group of 
nuclear utilities providing financial sponsorship. A significant proportion of the work 
was performed by the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) Petten under JRC funding. 
The main subcontractor was VTT. 
The ideas developed in this work were originally discussed within the ENIQ Steering 
Committee. ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and Qualification, was set up 
in 1992 in recognition of the importance of the issue of qualification of NDE inspection 
procedures used in in-service inspection programmes for nuclear power plants. Driven 
by European nuclear utilities and managed by the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) in Petten, the Netherlands, ENIQ is intended to be a network 
in which available resources and expertise are managed at European level. ENIQ 
work is carried out by two sub-groups: the Task Group on Qualification (TGQ) focuses 
on the qualification of in-service inspection (ISI) systems, and the Task Group on Risk 
(TGR) focuses on risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) issues. More information 
on the ENIQ network and its activities can be found at 
http://safelife.jrc.ec.europa.eu/eniq/. 
This report is essentially the same as that previously issued as a Doosan Babcock 
internal report (BWO Shepherd, L Gandossi, KA Simola, Link Between Risk-Informed 
In-Service Inspection and Inspection Qualification, Report No. TR-08-071, Project 
79622). ENIQ has decided to publish this report as an ENIQ type-3 document, so that 
its content receives a more widespread circulation. Publication was approved by the 
ENIQ Steering Committee. The authors are BWO Shepherd (Doosan Babcock), L 
Gandossi (JRC) and KA Simola (VTT). 
The voting members of the ENIQ Steering Committee are:  
R Chapman   British Energy, United Kingdom 
P Dombret  Tractebel, Belgium 
K Hukkanen   Teollisuuden Voima OY, Finland 
R Schwammberger  Kernkraftwerk Leibastadt, Switzerland 
B Neundorf   Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy, Germany 
J Neupauer   Slovenské Elektrárne, Slovakia 
S Pérez   Iberdrola, Spain 
U Sandberg   Forsmark NPP, Sweden 
P Kopcil   Dukovany NPP, Czech Republic 
D Szabó   Paks NPP, Hungary 
The European Commission representatives in ENIQ are L Gandossi and T Seldis. 
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 SUMMARY 
There is a growing need for a quantitative measure of inspection effectiveness as an 
input to quantitative risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI). A Probability of 
Detection (POD) curve could provide a suitable metric. However there can be 
significant problems associated with generating realistic POD curves by practical 
trials. The ENIQ inspection qualification methodology can provide high assurance that 
an inspection system will achieve its objectives, but is not designed to provide a 
quantitative measure of the type that can be used in RI-ISI analysis. 
A project was therefore set up with the following objectives: 
• Investigate approaches to quantifying the confidence associated with 
inspection qualification. 
• Produce guidelines on how to relate inspection qualification results, risk 
reduction and inspection interval. 
• Apply the guidelines in practice via a pilot study, and modify them as required 
based on the experiences from the pilot study. 
• Provide a forum for focused discussion and agreement on the approaches and 
guidelines. 
The report discusses how a simplified POD curve, such as a step curve, could be 
used as the target for inspection qualification, or as an output from it. Work to 
investigate the sensitivity of relative risk reduction to the details of the POD curve is 
described from which it is concluded that use of a simplified POD curve could be 
justified. 
Two methods for quantifying the outcome from inspection qualification are described.  
The first method is a relatively simple process based on direct expert judgement.  
Previous work to investigate the relationship between POD and margin of detection, 
which could facilitate this judgement, is discussed. 
The second method is based on a more rigorous structured process employing 
Bayesian statistics, in which the subjective degree of belief in inspection capability 
derived from a Technical Justification (TJ) is expressed in probabilistic terms, and 
combined with data from practical trials results. Guidelines for the application of this 
Bayesian Methodology are provided in an Annex. 
Two pilot studies are described which involved a qualification body applying the 
quantification methods in practice. 
Work to model the relation between inspection qualification outcome, risk reduction 
and inspection interval is described, and an example of this process based on data 
from the 2nd pilot study is presented. 
The main objectives of the project were achieved. Recommendations for further work 
to make the approaches developed more robust are provided. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
This final report describes the work performed and presents the results from the group 
sponsored project “Link Between Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection and Inspection 
Qualification”. The project was coordinated by Doosan Babcock with a group of 
nuclear utilities providing financial sponsorship. A significant proportion of the work 
was performed by the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) Petten under JRC funding. 
The main subcontractor was VTT. 
The project officially started in June 2006 and had an initial planned duration of 15 
months. An increase in sponsorship above the original target allowed the workscope 
to be extended with a final completion date of May 2008. 
The sponsors were: 
1) Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB (representing a group of Swedish utilities) 
2) TVO 
3) VGB PowerTech Service GmbH 
4) Iberdrola SA 
The sponsors were kept informed of progress through periodic progress reports and 
meetings, and they had the opportunity to steer the direction of the project. 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
In-service inspection plays a key role in ensuring the continued safe and economic 
operation of nuclear plant. It is therefore very important that the effectiveness of the 
inspection system (combination of inspection equipment, procedure and personnel) is 
properly understood and achieves the intended performance in practice. In Europe, 
this inspection qualification is widely performed in accordance with the European 
Network for Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ) methodology [Ref. 1]. 
The inspection locations, frequencies and methods have traditionally been based 
primarily on the type and safety category of the equipment determined from the 
original design basis.  However improvements in probabilistic safety assessments 
combined with many years’ operating experience have resulted in increasing interest 
in the adoption of risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI). ENIQ has recently 
issued a discussion document which provides a general framework for RI-ISI [Ref. 2]. 
Although consequence of failure is not influenced by inspection, the probability of 
failure is. The effectiveness of inspection is therefore an important input for RI-ISI 
analysis. If a quantitative RI-ISI analysis is to be performed, then a quantitative 
measure of inspection effectiveness is needed in order to calculate the reduction in 
risk associated with inspection. A Probability of Detection (POD) curve would provide 
ideal data. 
POD data is normally generated by performing practical trials on a large number of 
defects in test pieces. The probability of detection is then plotted against an 
appropriate defect parameter. From statistics, a minimum of 29 defects with the same 
parameter all need to be detected in order to establish a 90% probability of detection 
at a lower bound confidence of 95%. This provides just one point on the POD curve. 
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 It can be relatively straightforward to establish POD curves for NDT methods such as 
magnetic particle or dye penetrant testing, where the main parameter influencing 
detection is generally defect length. However in the case of ultrasonic inspection 
(which is the main NDT method for ISI of nuclear plant) there are many defect 
variables which affect detectability, such as defect depth, length, location, tilt, skew, 
shape, and roughness.  
In recognition of these limitations, the ENIQ approach to inspection qualification is 
based on a combination of technical justification and test piece trials. Technical 
justification involves assembling supporting evidence for inspection capability (results 
of capability evaluation exercises, feedback from site experience, theoretical models, 
physical reasoning). The balance between the various elements and the level of detail 
involved in qualification are judged separately for each case. 
The output from the ENIQ qualification process is generally a statement concluding 
whether or not there is high confidence that the required inspection capability will be 
achieved in practice, for the specified inspection system, component and defect 
range. However the ENIQ methodology is not designed to provide a quantitative 
measure of inspection capability of the type which can be used by quantitative RI-ISI. 
It also means it is difficult to “benchmark” the confidence associated with any given 
inspection qualification. 
This group sponsored project was therefore set up to investigate and demonstrate 
approaches which provide some objective measure of the confidence which comes 
from inspection qualification, and which allow risk reduction associated with a qualified 
inspection to be calculated.  
 
3 OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the project as defined in the project proposal [Ref. 3] were to: 
• Investigate approaches to quantifying the confidence associated wth 
inspection qualification. 
• Produce guidelines on how to relate inspection qualification results, risk 
reduction and inspection interval. 
• Apply the guidelines in practice via a pilot study, and modify them as required 
based on the experiences from the pilot study. 
• Provide a forum for focused discussion and agreement on the approaches and 
guidelines.  
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 4 OVERVIEW OF WORKSCOPE 
The main elements of the work were:  
• Investigate the concept of using a simplified POD curve to represent 
inspection performance, including a study of the sensitivity of risk to level of 
detail in the POD curve 
• Develop draft guidelines on how to use direct expert judgement quantify 
inspection performance as a POD during qualification 
• Develop draft guidelines on how to use a Bayesian statistics approach to 
quantify inspection performance as a POD during qualification 
• Perform pilot studies using these draft guidelines to quantify the outcome from 
qualification of two technical justifications. Update the guidelines to take 
account of lessons learnt from the pilot studies. 
• Illustrate how, if defect growth can be modelled, it is possible to link inspection 
qualification results, risk reduction and inspection interval.  
• Issue final report and guidelines and provide recommendations for any further 
work. 
Each of these is described in turn in the following sections. 
 
5 ADOPTION OF SIMPLIFIED POD CURVE 
As explained above, it is generally not practicable to produce a POD curve for specific 
combinations of plant component and UT inspection system based on experimental 
data, and the ENIQ process is not designed to produce such a curve. However it is 
possible to define a POD curve which, if it were met in practice, would achieve a given 
level of risk reduction. It might then be possible to use this user-defined POD curve as 
the target for qualification. The task of the qualification body would then be to judge 
whether or not this POD curve could be considered a lower bound for actual 
inspection capability.  
Alternatively, no target POD might be specified beforehand, and the inspection 
qualification body is asked to quantify inspection performance in terms of POD. 
It will be easier for the qualification body to make this judgement the simpler the 
shape of the POD curve, regardless of whether it is provided as a target, or whether it 
is required as an output. The simplest case will be a step function where a fixed POD 
is assumed for defects above the qualification size, and no detection capability 
assumed for defects below that size. It will also be easier the lower the POD required.  
However the risk reduction associated with an inspection will tend to increase if credit 
is taken for detecting defects below this “cut-off” qualification size, and will also tend to 
increase the higher the POD for a given defect size. It is therefore useful to 
understand the sensitivity of risk reduction to the level of detail in the POD curve.  
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 This was studied by JRC and the work is reported in detail in [Ref. 4]. A summary of 
the work follows. 
In broad engineering terms, the risk of failure of a component (e.g. a weld) is given by 
 Risk=pof x cof (1)
where pof is the probability of failure and cof the consequence of that failure, 
expressed in some sort of convenient metric.  
It is assumed that the inspection system under consideration has been designed to 
target a specific acting degradation mechanism leading to crack-like defects. The 
inspection programme will only affect the probability of failure. As an inspection is 
carried out, some knowledge regarding the (previously uncertain) state of the plant is 
gathered, and the probability of failure is (usually) reduced. If defective components 
are found, these are assumed to be repaired or removed. The consequence of failure, 
depending on many factors such as plant layout, presence of redundant or mitigating 
systems, etc. will not be affected by the inspection. It is therefore straightforward to 
see how the risk will change before and after an inspection is carried out by simply 
considering the change in probability of failure. 
A risk reduction percentage, R, can be defined as: 
 100)1( ⋅−=
without
with
pof
pofR  (2)
where pofwithout is the probability of failure without inspection, and pofwith is the 
probability of failure with inspection. Values of R close to 100 mean a significant risk 
reduction due to the inspection. A perfect inspection (one capable of finding all defects 
of all sizes) will reduce the probability of failure pofwith to zero, and therefore R will be 
equal to 100. On the other hand, values of R close to zero mean a small change in 
risk, due to a poor inspection.  
In a detailed, fully quantitative approach to RI-ISI, the inspection programme would be 
modelled within a probabilistic structural integrity model. In this case, extensive 
knowledge or assumptions are needed about materials, loadings, initial crack 
distribution, crack growth behaviour, probability of detection, etc. Typically, a Monte 
Carlo analysis of the problem would be performed, repeating many times over a 
deterministic structural integrity assessment, each time sampling the required input 
parameters from the appropriate distributions and verifying whether the structure has 
failed or is in a safe state for that particular combination of input variables. The main 
drawback is the much higher requirement in terms of resources such as time, 
calculating power, need to know (or to make assumptions about) material properties, 
loadings, etc. 
A simplified approach was therefore considered and the possibility of crack growth 
was ignored.  
An inner surface breaking crack in the component is postulated. The through-wall 
extent of such crack, a, (also called “depth”) is assumed to be a random variable and 
is normalised with respect to the component thickness so that it takes any value 
between 0 and 1. 
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 The following functions are then considered: 
• A probability distribution of flaw size, λ(a) 
• A function expressing the probability of failure as a function of flaw size, φ(a) 
• A POD curve, p(a) 
If the functions λ(a), φ(a) and p(a) are defined, it is straightforward to calculate the 
probability of failure without inspection, pofwithout, by integrating λ(a)× φ(a) over the flaw 
size: 
  ∫= 1
0
)()( daaapofwithout φλ (3)
And, since 1-p(a) is the probability of missing a defect of size a, the probability of 
failure with inspection, pofwith, is given by: 
  ∫ −= 1
0
))(1)(()( daapaapofwith φλ (4)
The risk reduction percentage expressed in Equation 2 can therefore be evaluated 
and was used to study the influence of different types of POD curve on risk reduction, 
as a function of defect distribution and material toughness (sensitivity of failure 
probability to flaw size). Note that in this study the number (or frequency) of cracks 
has no effect, since it would increase pofwith by the same percentage as pofwithout, and 
R would remain unchanged. 
It should also be noted that in this approach it is assumed that the probability of 
failure, φ(a), and the probability of detection, p(a), are functions of crack depth only.  
Although there is a lack of information on the distribution of defects in nuclear plant, 
the limited information available suggests an exponential distribution. Figure 1 below 
illustrates some defect distributions modelled by the truncated exponential function. 
Since Ref. 4 describes this function, it is sufficient here to note that the different 
distributions have been derived by varying its parameter µ. A small value for µ 
represents defects being mainly at the small end of the spectrum whereas as µ 
increases the distribution becomes more uniform.  
Probability of failure was also modelled, in this case using the cumulative Beta 
distribution and varying parameters α and β (see Ref. 4). Figure 2 below illustrates 
three distributions corresponding to different parameters. Selecting α and β both equal 
to 1 represents a case where probability of failure increases in direct proportion to 
crack depth. The two other cases illustrated represent a situation where probability of 
failure becomes high even for relatively small cracks (brittle material) and where 
probability of failure remains low until crack size is relatively high (tough material). 
The third function modelled was the POD curve. For this study, simple functions were 
used to approximate the shape of the POD curve. A first convenient approximation is 
to suppose that the POD is zero for all crack sizes a below a certain threshold depth 
ath, and equal to a plateau value ppl for a > ath. In Figure 3, two such curves are 
illustrated, the first defined for ath=0.2 and ppl=0.9, and the second for ath=0.4 and 
ppl=0.8.  
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 A second type of POD curve which can be considered is only slightly more 
sophisticated, showing a sloped transition between p=0 and p=ppl (and thus requiring 
for complete definition a third parameter, apl, i.e. the crack depth at which p=ppl is 
attained). Figure 3 also includes one example of such a curve (ath=0.6, apl=0.7 and 
ppl=0.7). This latter type of curve was used to investigate the value added by having a 
slightly more informative POD curve. 
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Figure 1 Defect size distributions 
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Figure 2 Probability of failure distributions 
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Figure 3 Simplified POD curves 
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Figure 4 Nine base cases for POD sensitivity investigation 
 15 
 Having defined the functions representing defect distribution, probability of failure and 
POD, the risk reduction R can be determined using equations (2), (3) and (4). 
Risk reduction was calculated first of all for the case of a step-curve POD (ath = apl), for 
each of the 9 cases illustrated in Figure 4. 
The risk reduction as a function of ath (defect qualification size) and ppl (maximum 
POD) was then calculated for each of these base cases (POD is a step curve). 
Ref. 4 presents the full set of results but one example is provided in Figure 5 below. 
This presents the results from base case 3a which is possibly the most representative 
of material in nuclear plant. 
Curves such as these can be used to make a choice on how the resources allocated 
to the design and qualification of an inspection system could be invested. Different 
strategies could be envisaged: 
• For a given, fixed ath, (which could be seen as the target defect qualification size) 
determine which level ppl should be used to obtain the desired risk reduction; 
• For a given, fixed ppl, determine which ath should be used to obtain the desired 
risk reduction; 
• A combination of the two above, maximising the risk reduction for the given 
resources (it could be the case that it is much easier – and cheaper – to push 
down ath rather than push up ppl, and still obtain the same risk reduction. 
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Figure 5 Sensitivity of R to POD parameters, base case 3a 
It is important to note that the risk reduction R is a relative measurement, comparing 
risk with and without inspection. When R is close to 100 a significant risk reduction is 
achieved. When R approaches zero only a small change in risk is achieved. It does 
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 not on its own provide an insight into absolute risk reduction. For example reducing 
risk by 50% for case 2c (brittle material, significant proportion of large defects present) 
might be more valuable than reducing risk by 99% for case 3a (tough material, only 
small defects present). 
The sensitivity of risk reduction to the level of detail in a POD curve was also 
investigated (the examples above were based on a simple step curve.) This was done 
by considering how risk reduction is affected by different slopes of the POD curve 
from its plateau value at ap down to its zero value at ath (see Figure 3 and the 
preceding text). 
Figure 6 plots the results for base case 2b. Risk reduction is plotted for various values 
of apl (crack size at which plateau is reached) and various values of ppl (plateau value 
of POD) against ath (crack size at which POD becomes zero). For a given apl, the 
slope of the POD curve is more gradual the lower the value of ath. 
This figure illustrates how risk reduction “credit” can be taken for detecting defects 
below apl for this particular case whereas approximating the POD as an abrupt step 
curve (ath = apl) results in a lower calculated risk reduction. As expected, this risk 
reduction is higher, the lower apl is and the higher ppl is (detection of smaller defects, 
higher POD at plateau). 
Figure 7 shows the results for base case 3a (expected to be most realistic for material 
in nuclear plant). In this case the sensitivity of risk reduction is quite different. Unless 
apl is quite high (large defect qualification size) there is no advantage in taking into 
account detection capabilty for defects below apl and in fact risk reduction does not 
even appear to depend on the value of apl. It only depends on ppl (POD at plateau). 
This approach to studying the sensitivity of risk reduction to the level and detail in the 
POD curve can be a very useful means of establishing an appropriate balance 
between risk reduction on the one hand, and avoiding placing excessive demands on 
the inspection system and expressing its capability as a detailed POD curve, on the 
other. 
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Figure 6 Sensitivity of risk to POD slope, base case 2b 
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Figure 7 Sensitivity of risk to POD slope, base case 3a 
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 6 DIRECT EXPERT JUDGEMENT OF POD 
As discussed in the introduction to Section 5, it may be possible to define a simple 
POD curve as the target for inspection qualification (“user-defined” POD curve), or to 
request a simple POD curve as the output from qualification. The task of the 
qualification body (QB) will be easier, the simpler the shape of the curve and the lower 
the POD required. The approach described in Section 5 can be used to explore the 
sensitivity of risk to simplifying the POD. 
The POD might be a simple step curve, with POD defined as some uniform level 
above the defect qualification depth, and taken to be zero below it. Figure 8 illustrates 
an example of this where the defect qualification size is 8mm and the target POD 
above this is 80%. 
 
Figure 8 User Defined POD as Step Curve 
In this case the qualification body would be asked to judge whether, on the basis of 
the qualification evidence provided, the inspection system should detect at least 80% 
of defects exceeding 8mm depth (and within the specified range of orientations, 
locations, shapes etc.) 
The higher the POD level, the greater the risk reduction associated with the 
inspection. However as the target POD level increases, it may become increasingly 
difficult for the inspection system to meet that target. It is also likely to become 
increasingly difficult for the inspection qualification body to judge whether that target is 
achieved.  
Even if the qualification body does not feel able to confirm that the inspection system 
will meet the target POD, it would still be useful to know what POD the QB agrees can 
be considered a lower bound. This could be determined by establishing first of all 
whether there was consensus among the QB members that the POD exceeded some 
low level such as 50% (for such an extreme case it would be hoped that this 
consensus would be reached immediately). The QB would then establish whether 
there was consensus that the POD exceeded some higher level, such as 60%, and so 
on until some POD level was reached which the QB felt unable to confirm was met. 
This process is illustrated in Table 1 below which also allows the confidence 
associated with the result to be recorded. 
If the QB is 80% confident that at least 50% of the defects meeting the defect 
specification will be detected by the inspection system described, then a tick is placed 
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 opposite “50%”. The QB then moves to the second row. If it is 80% confident that at 
least 60% will be detected then a tick is also placed opposite “60%” and so on. When 
a level is reached where the QB considers it is not possible to make a judgement then 
a question mark is placed opposite it.  
The “95% confidence” column is completed in the same way, but in this case based 
on a confidence level of 95%. 
The Table could be completed by the QB members working as a team, or they could 
complete the Table independently and then compare and discuss their results. The 
discussion might influence some QB members to change their scores, after which 
they either attempt to produce a single set of results representing the QB as a whole 
(e.g. by averaging individual scores) or the QB reports the individual scores. It would 
then be the responsibility of the risk analyst to decide whether e.g. to average or use 
the most pessimistic value. 
POD 
80% confident that 
inspection exceeds 
(example) 
95% confident that 
inspection exceeds 
(example) 
50% √ √ 
60% √ √ 
70% √ √ 
80% √ √ 
90% √ √ 
95% √ ? 
98% ? ? 
Table 1 Example of Direct Judgement Table 
The higher the POD value used as the target for qualification, the more difficult it will 
be for the qualification body to be confident that the inspection system meets this 
target. Lowering the target will simplify matters, but at the expense of reducing the risk 
reduction which can be credited. The main problem facing the qualification body is in 
knowing how to relate evidence on inspection capability to a POD value. There might 
be evidence from trials, modelling and physical reasoning that all defects (within the 
prescribed range) should be above the reporting threshold and well above the noise 
level but does this mean the POD for such defects is at least 90%? 
In order to help make this judgement, the work described in Ref. 5 has been 
performed to relate both signal to noise (S/N) ratio, and signal above report threshold, 
to POD (defect detection rate is a more correct term since the defect sample sizes 
were relatively small). The work involved a series of blind manual and automated UT 
trials on test pieces containing a range of artificial defects which provided a range of 
signal to noise, and signal to report threshold ratios. Relationships were established 
between these margins of detection, and “POD”. For manual UT, the relationship was 
that presented in Table 2.  
Note that the artificial defects and test pieces did not need to be realistic simulations 
of actual defects and components since they were only required to act as sources of 
various levels of signals. A benefit of this approach is that unlike a POD curve the 
data generated from these trials may be generic, i.e. applicable to a broad range of 
inspection procedures, components and defect types.  
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S/N mean Hits  Misses “POD” 
0 – 2.4 - - - 
2.5 – 4.9 - - - 
5.0 – 7.4 7 14 33 
7.5 – 9.9 32 24 57 
10.0 – 12.4 37 19 66 
12.5 – 14.9 24 4 86 
15.0 – 17.4 7 0 100 
17.5 – 19.9 - - - 
Table 2 Relationship between S/N and POD (manual UT) 
As an example of the way in which these results could be used in practice, the 
proposed RI-ISI programme might be based on the assumption that defects above 
15% wall thickness will be detected with a POD of at least 80%. 
The role of the inspection qualification body would then be to make a judgement on 
the detectability of defects which exceeded this depth, and which were within certain 
other ranges determined by metallurgical considerations (covering tilt range, skew 
range, roughness, shape, location etc.) 
Based on some combination of practical trials, theoretical modelling, physical 
reasoning and previous experience, the qualification body might conclude that all such 
defects should be detected with signal at least 14dB above noise.  
Using the relationship suggested by Table 2, there would then be supporting evidence 
that the POD for such defects is around 86%, and the inspection system should 
therefore achieve the target POD. 
Note that this simple example is for illustrative purposes only. Caution should be 
exercised when applying the results of Reference 5 since the defect population sizes 
were relatively small and POD can depend on more than just signal to noise ratio or 
signal above report threshold. For example in the case of automated UT it can also 
depend on pattern recognition. Further work to put the results of Reference 5 on a 
more conclusive footing is recommended. 
 
7 BAYESIAN METHODOLOGY 
In order to quantify the ENIQ qualification methodology, a Bayesian approach was 
proposed [Ref. 6] where the level of "confidence" in the technical justification is 
expressed in probabilistic terms. Bayesian statistics is widely applied in many 
scientific and technological fields. In this framework, it is particularly appealing 
because it offers a formal way of treating subjective probabilities (i.e. expert 
judgment).  
According to the Bayesian interpretation, probability is a subjective degree of belief 
about events of interest based on the available evidence. In a Bayesian framework, 
the initial degree of belief regarding an unknown (or uncertain) variable is represented 
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 with a prior distribution. If there is no relevant evidence available, one should choose 
a so-called non-informative prior, which has minimal effect relative to data/experiment 
on the final inference. The prior distribution is then updated as new evidence is 
collected, using the Bayes’ theorem. The resulting distribution is called the posterior 
distribution. When enough experimental evidence is available, it overwhelms the 
choice of prior and the results of Bayesian and frequentist analyses converge. 
In the model, a population of defects is considered, characterised by a single, fixed 
flaw size, a. All the variables, such as component type and material, acting damage 
mechanism, the defect attributes (morphology, etc.) and the NDT system that is to be 
applied (procedure, equipment and personnel), are assumed to be defined (i.e. they 
need not to be specified). A value of the probability of detection, p, intrinsic to the NDT 
system under consideration (seen as the combination of all the above-mentioned 
variables) must exist. In the frequentistic interpretation of probability, p can be seen as 
the percentage of detection of that given class of defects, i.e. the number of detected 
defects divided by the total number of trials, as the total number of trials approaches 
infinity. 
A trial in this context is considered as an opportunity to detect a defect, e.g. if there 
are 50 defects in the component or test piece inspected, or if there are 50 
components or test pieces inspected and each contains one defect, the number of 
trials would be 50. 
In the Bayesian statistical framework, it is assumed that the results of test piece trials 
are treated as a sample from a binomial distribution with parameter p. p is an 
unknown and fixed number in classical and frequentistic statistics, whereas it is 
considered as a random variable (with an associate probability distribution) in 
Bayesian statistics. It is natural to choose the Beta distribution to model the 
uncertainty related to p. The Beta distribution is conjugate to the binomial distribution 
and that renders the calculation of posterior distributions particularly simple. Thus: 
 p ∼ Beta (α, β) (5)
The parameters  α and β determine the shape of the Beta distribution. The distribution 
is defined for α>0 and β>0. If α>1 and β>1, the Beta distribution is unimodal. In this 
case, the expected value, E(p), is given by α/(α+β) and the mode by (α−1)/(α+β−2). If 
α  = 1 and β  = 1, the Beta distribution becomes the uniform distribution.  
Figure 9 illustrates two examples of a Beta function to clarify what it represents. One 
has α  = 1 and β  = 1 which is the situation where there is no prior knowledge 
regarding the value of p. If p represents POD, then in the absence of any other 
information, it is as likely that POD is 0% as it is to be 100%. The probability 
distribution is thus uniform. The other curve has α  = 10 and β  = 2. In this case POD 
is likely to be around 95%, but could still be higher or lower as determined by its 
probability distribution. 
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Figure 9 Examples of Beta distributions 
In the Bayesian framework, the process starts by expressing the prior knowledge 
regarding p in the following way: 
 p ∼ Beta (αprior, β prior) (6)
If nothing is known about p before, a reasonable choice for the prior parameters would 
be αprior = 1 and βprior = 1, expressing the fact that p could be anywhere in the interval 
[0, 1] with equal probability. 
The second step of the process consists of gathering evidence regarding p. The most 
natural way to do so would be to carry out a number N of practical trials. In doing so, 
let us assume that the number of successes is Ns and the number of failures is Nf, so 
that N=Ns+Nf. The advantage of choosing a Beta distribution for p comes into play 
when determining the posterior. It can be shown that the posterior distribution is 
simply obtained as follows:
  
fpriorpost
spriorpost
Nββ
Nαα
+
+
=
=
(7)
At this stage, knowledge regarding p is fully expressed by 
  )β,Beta(α~p postpost (8)
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 An attractive property of the updating process is that if new evidence becomes 
available, it can be readily used to obtain a second posterior. Notably, the order in 
which the first and second sets of trials are carried out does not affect the outcome. 
Figure 10 illustrates how the Beta function (representing the probability distribution for 
POD) changes as is updated to take account of additional information. 
prior
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Figure 10 Examples of Beta function updating 
The essential idea proposed in [Ref. 6] follows naturally from these considerations 
and consists in interpreting the TJ in terms of an equivalent set of practical trials. It is 
suggested that the TJ be quantified using two numbers: an equivalent total number of 
trials, NTJ, and an equivalent number of successes, NTJ, s. For example it might be 
considered that a TJ provided the same degree of confidence in the inspection system 
as the detection during actual inspections of 19 out of 20 defects (which were within 
the defect qualification specification). In this case the TJ would be quantified as NTJ = 
20 and NTJ, s = 19. 
These numbers, provided by qualification experts in a documented and transparent 
manner, could in principle be used in combination with the number of practical trials, 
Ntrials, and associated number of successes, Ntrials, s to support the final statement that 
the NDE system can be considered qualified. Figure 11 schematically illustrates this 
idea. 
The posterior distribution for p, expressed in Eq. (7), would thus be defined by the 
following parameters: 
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The problem is now to assign meaningful values to the quantities NTJ and NTJ, s. In 
[Ref. 6] different approaches to tackle this issue were proposed. The discussion was 
further expanded (and complemented with several worked examples) in [Ref. 7].  
 Before beginning of qualification exercise 
Analyse practical trials results: 
• number of trials, Ntrials 
• number of successes, Ntrials, s 
Prove target achievement 
Associate to TJ: 
• equivalent number of trials, NTJ 
• equivalent number of successes, NTJ, s 
No knowledge, uniform prior (αprior=1, βprior=1) 
Determine posterior parameters reflecting TJ 
strength: 
αTJ = αprior+ NTJ, s 
βTJ = βprior+ (NTJ – NTJ, s) 
Perform TJ 
Determine final posterior parameters: 
αpost = αTJ+ Ntrials, s 
βpost = βTJ+ (Ntrials – Ntrials, s) 
Determine point estimates (mode, mean) and interval 
estimates (lower bound confidence intervals) for 
probability of detection, p. 
 
Figure 11 Principles of the proposed Bayesian framework the quantitative 
modelling of the ENIQ methodology 
The following basic principles were postulated to apply: 
• If some evidence is missing, this should imply less weight for the TJ posterior. 
This means that the equivalent TJ sample size, NTJ, should be smaller than in the 
case of stronger evidence. 
• If evidence is present showing that some defects could be missed, this should 
imply a lower expected value of the TJ posterior, i.e. the ratio of NTJ,s over NTJ 
should be smaller than in the case where the evidence is more convincing 
regarding detection capability. 
It was also assumed that the TJ can be broken down into a number of elements and 
that the impact of each element towards demonstrating inspection capability is 
independent from the others. These elements could be for instance theoretical 
modelling experimental evidence, parametric studies, equipment considerations, data 
analysis, etc.  
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 8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POD, RISK REDUCTION AND 
INSPECTION INTERVAL 
In section 5.1 the sensitivity of risk, or failure probability, to POD was discussed 
without taking into consideration the initiation and growth of flaws. In this section, the 
POD sensitivity studies are extended to take into account the inspection intevals. The 
studies are performed with an approach that integrates probabilistic fracture 
mechanics (PFM) calculations with a discrete time Markov process analysis to model 
piping degradation states at inspections, and to account for flaw and leak detection 
probabilities. Similar analyses could be performed with other probabilistic fracture 
mechanistic tools as well, as long as they have an option to account for inspection 
reliability and intervals. 
8.1 Approach for the Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Simulations 
In the examples of this section, the probabilistic crack growth analyses were carried 
out with a modified version of fracture mechanistic analysis code VTTBESIT, 
developed by the Fraunhofer-Institut für Werkstoffmechanik (IWM), Germany and by 
VTT. With the VTTBESIT code it is possible to quickly compute the stress intensity 
factor values along the crack front and based on this simulation data the crack growth. 
VTTBESIT was modified by adding probabilistic capabilities to the code, which was 
originally intended for deterministic fracture mechanics based crack growth analyses. 
In the analysis with the probabilistic version of VTTBESIT, the following randomised 
input parameters were used: exponential distribution for initial crack depth, 
exponential distribution for initial crack length and Poisson distribution for thermal load 
cycle frequency. The amount of crack growth in each time step is calculated from the 
respective crack growth (for instance fatigue or stress corrosion cracking) equation. 
The simulation ends either when the crack depth reaches the outer pipe surface, or 
the time cycles reach the end of plant lifetime. For each analysed case, hundreds or 
even thousands of separate simulations are calculated, and for each of these values 
of the above mentioned distributed input data parameters/variables are sampled at 
random from the respective probabilistic distributions. Each run is a 60-year 
simulation with the crack depth calculated at 1-year intervals, conditional on the 
existence of an initial flaw. The annual crack depth information for each simulation is 
tranferred to the second phase of the analyses. 
In the second phase, the analyses are based on Markov processes. The Markov 
process is a stochastic process in which the probability distribution of the current state 
is conditionally independent of the path of past states, a characteristic called the 
Markov property. In the current application the states of the Markov process 
correspond to crack penetration depths in the material, and the transition probabilities 
from a lower state to higher states (deeper cracks). The effects of inspections are 
included in the model as transitions from a crack state to a flawless state. A similar 
approach to study inspection strategies using Markov models has been suggested in 
[Ref. 8]. The main novelty here is the use of PFM modelling to generate transition 
probabilities to model the crack growth. 
The principle of a simple Markov model is illustrated in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 Illustration of a Markov model for degradation and repair 
In this illustration we have defined the following states: 0 = no detectable flaw, 1 = a 
detectable flaw, 2 = detectable leak, 3 = rupture. λij and µij are transition rates (or 
probabilities per cycle) from state i to state j. λij symbolise growh rates, while µij 
describe detection and repair rates.  
The state transition matrix for the above system is: 
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In our discretised model, we use probabilities instead of rates. We can also define 
several states for different flaw depths, and define different flaw detection probabilities 
for each depth state. 
Transition probabilities from one state to the other higher states are generated from 
the results of the PFM simulations. From the simulations we obtain information on the 
flaw depth once a year, and this size is assigned to a state representing a certain 
range of depth. The data tell how many years has been spent in each of these states, 
and if there is a transition to a higher state. The transition probability frpm state i to j 
(j>i), pij, is obtained by dividing the number of transitions from i to j by the number of 
years spent in state i. In theory any number of states can be used, but the PFM 
simulation step limits this number. Depending on the application a suitable number of 
states is between 5 and 10. 
The general discrete-time Markov process is: 
 Mpp tt ×= −1  (11)
where tp  (t = 1,2,3…) is a vector containing the state probabilities (i.e. probability that 
the flaw has advanced to that state) for step t, and M is a matrix containing the state 
transition probabilities. 0p  is a vector describing the initial flaw depth distribution of 
the component. 
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 For better modularity and ease of application this basic Markov process is modified to 
use two different state transition matrices. The degradation matrix Mdeg models the 
crack growth, and the inspection matrix Mins models the inspections. While the 
degradation matrix affects the state probabilities each year, inspections affect it only 
on those years inspections are performed, yielding the following modified discrete-
time Markov process: 
 ( )Ι⋅−+⋅××= − ))(1()(deg1 tBMtBMpp instt  (12)
where B(t) is a Boolean function with value 1 if inspections are performed at time step 
t and 0 if no inspections are performed at time step t, and I is a unit matrix. While any 
length can be chosen for the time step, one year seems natural for RI-ISI application, 
since the outages during which inspections could be performed are usually once a 
year. 
The Markov process was coded and the results were calculated with Matlab software.  
8.2 Examples of Simulations  
We illustrate the development of crack growth and the effect of inspections with some 
examples. The examples cover different degradation mechanisms: stress corrosion 
cracking and thermal fatigue. 
8.2.1 Stress corrosion cracking initiation and growth  
Our first example assumes intergranular stress corrosion cracking initiation and 
growth in an austenitic piping weld. Here we also demonstrate how a decrease in 
POD can be compensated with a shortened inspection interval. 
Let us assume two alternative POD step functions, as shown in Figure 13. In both 
cases the POD is 0 for cracks smaller than 20% of the wall thickness. For cracks 
exceeding 20% of the wall thickness, POD 1 is 0.9 and POD2 is 0.8. 
                   
POD 1
0
0,5
1
 
POD 2
0
0,5
1
Figure 13 POD functions used in the example. 
Figure 14 shows the yearly rupture probabilities for three cases: without inspections, 
inspections with POD1 at 10 years interval and inspections with POD2 at 8 years 
interval. In this case, where we have no manufacturing flaws, but the IGSCC cracks 
are initiated according to a frequency and size distribution estimated from Swedish 
experience data, and the annual rupture probability is an increasing function. 
The mean yearly rupture probability for the case without inspections is 3.7E-5, for 
POD1 case it is 2.3E-6, and for POD2 case 2.4E-6. Thus a similar yearly rupture 
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 probability is achieved by shortening the inspection interval for the lower quality 
inspections. In terms of the risk reduction measure defined in Section 5, this is a risk 
reduction of 94 % calculated over the assumed 60 year component lifetime. 
8.2.2 Crack growth due to thermal fatigue  
In a second example, we illustrate a case with thermal fatigue. In the case of thermal 
fatigue induced cracking it is typical that a crack either grows very fast or hardly at all. 
Two PODs are considered: POD1 is the same as in the previous case. For the other 
(POD3), the POD for cracks exceeding 20% of the wall thickness is only 0.65. 
Figure 15 shows the development of yearly rupture probabilities without inspections 
and the different inspection strategies, POD1 and POD3 both with 10 year inspection 
intervals. Yearly rupture probability for the two POD cases are almost identical despite 
POD3 having much lower probability of detection than POD1. Mean yearly rupture 
probability without inspections is 1.7E-4, for POD curve 1 it is 1.5E-4, and for POD 
curve 5 it is 1.5E-4. The risk reduction is only 12%. In a case like this it is unlikely that 
an inspection will reveal a crack before it grows through wall. 
 
Figure 14 Yearly rupture probability for POD1 (solid line), POD2 (dashed line), 
and no inspections (dash-dotted line), IGSCC initiation case. 
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Figure 15 Yearly rupture probability for POD1 (solid line) and POD3 (dashed 
line), and no inspections (dash-dotted line), thermal fatigue case. 
 
8.2.3 Concluding remarks  
The examples of this section illustrate an approach to account for the flaw initiation 
and growth in assessing the effect of inspections on the failure probability of a 
structural component. Besides the POD level and interval assumptions, the 
assumptions on the defect growth have an important effect on the efficiency of the 
inspections. If the growth is very fast compared to possible inspection intervals, it is 
obvious that other means for reducing the failure probability should be applied. 
These examples are based on a number of assumptions and limitations, related for 
instance to the randomised parameters of the probabilistic fracture mechanics model. 
The absolute values are thus subject to large uncertainties. The Markov property 
assumptions made for the transition from one flaw depth state to another can be 
questioned, since for some degradation mechanisms, it might be justified to assume a 
“memory” (the future growth depends not only on the present flaw size, but also on 
how this size has been achieved). Further, the assumptions in the inspection process 
are highly simplified, assuming that detecting a flaw returns the component to a 
flawless state. Despite these simplifying assumptions it is believed that the modelling 
approach gives reasonably realistic results for the comparison of alternative 
inspection strategies. 
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 9 PILOT QUALIFICATION EXERCISES 
9.1 Training of the Qualification Body members 
A one-day meeting was organised with the purpose of training the members in the 
relevant fields not strictly falling within their expertise areas, such as probability 
theory, etc. 
The day was structured around three main sessions. The first was dedicated to giving 
an introduction to expert judgement, with a focus on the biases and heuristics that are 
commonly encountered when eliciting probability statements from experts. The 
second was dedicated to revising the general concepts of probability relevant to the 
experimental determination of a population proportion. The third main session was 
dedicated to the Bayesian model for the quantification of the ENIQ methodology. In 
particular, worked examples were discussed. Finally, a discussion on the pilot study 
exercise (structure, duration, type of questions asked, etc.) took place. 
9.2 1st Pilot Study 
The purpose of the pilot qualification study was to study and as far as possible 
demonstrate approaches to quantifying the outcome from inspection qualification.  
These approaches varied from simple expert judgement to the application of a 
Bayesian methodology. The lessons learnt from the pilot study were taken into 
account before finalising the guidelines provided on how to quantify the outcome from 
inspection qualification. 
9.2.1 Preparation 
It was intended to trial three approaches: 
• Use of direct judgement to decide whether a simplified POD curve (e.g. a step 
function) can be considered as a lower bound for actual inspection capability 
(See Section 6) 
• Use of an experimentally derived relationship between margin of detection 
(e.g. signal to noise, signal to report threshold) and POD (See Section 6) 
• Use of the Bayesian method (See Section 7) 
Note that these approaches can be used in combination, e.g. approach (b) could be 
used in combination with approach (a) or (c).  
A technical justification (TJ) was provided for the pilot by a utility. This original TJ was 
modified for technical reasons and to respect the confidentiality of the utility which 
provided the dossier. Two variants of the TJ were produced with differing technical 
content in order to study the sensitivity of the results to TJ content. The TJs were 
referred to as TJ1 and TJ2. 
The use of a genuine TJ as the basis for the modified TJs was intended to ensure as 
far as practicable the realism and credibility of the pilot.  
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 9.2.2 Programme 
The pilot qualification body (QB) comprised J Whittle (J Whittle & Associates) as 
chairman, R Booler (Serco Assurance), H Söderstrand (SQC) and B Dikstra (Doosan 
Babcock). All have extensive experience of inspection qualification. 
L Gandossi, K Simola and B Shepherd had been involved in developing the 
quantification approaches and acted as facilitators. The QB was responsible for 
reviewing the TJs and applying (as far as the members felt able) the quantification 
methods.  
The ultimate decision on whether the outcome from any of the TJ variants could be 
quantified and what the quantified value was, rested with the QB. 
The pilot study was held in August 07 and lasted just under 3 days, including a short 
initial refresher session on the quantification methods and to address any queries 
before starting the quantification process. The programme was based on working 
through TJ2 using the three different approaches (a,b,c) in turn, and then repeating for 
TJ1. 
The order in which the approaches were applied was to be a, b, c to avoid the results 
of the more rigorous approach(es) influencing those based on direct judgement. 
 
9.2.3 Technical Justifications 
Two variants of the original TJ were produced. The original intention was that one TJ 
would present more information than the other, and that the “less complete” one 
would be quantified first, before revealing the additional information in the second TJ. 
It was thought that this would lead to more objective assessments than performing 
quantification of the more complete TJ first, then trying to ignore some of that 
information. 
It was subsequently decided that removing some of the information in the TJ could 
make the exercise unrealistic (artificially low quality of TJ) so instead it was decided to 
keep the same amount of information, but make it less convincing by reducing signal 
amplitudes in one of the TJs (see below for more detail). 
TJ1 and TJ2 covered the same component which was a circumferential weld in a 
large diameter vessel. Part of the weld had been excavated to remove defects prior to 
repair welding. The TJ covered both manual and automated ultrasonic procedures, 
which were based on the same probes, scanning patterns and reporting thresholds. 
The contents of each TJ included among other things input information (details of 
geometry, access, defects to be detected etc), physical reasoning to identify worst 
case defects, results of modelling to predict defect responses, and experimental 
evidence from open trials on test pieces. 
TJ1 and TJ2 were identical except that  
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 • all relevant experimentally measured and theoretically derived signal 
amplitudes from defects of concern were 4dB higher in TJ1 than in TJ2 (i.e. 
TJ1 represented improved inspection capability compared to TJ2); 
• some of the text was modified to reflect these differences, e.g. a phrase like 
“indications were well above threshold” in TJ1 was changed to “indications 
were above threshold” in TJ2. 
 
9.2.4 Quantification of TJ2 
9.2.4.1 Direct Judgement 
Each member of the QB had independently completed a table recording their direct 
expert judgement of POD separately for the manual and automated UT covered by 
TJ2. The principle was that they ticked boxes representing progressively higher POD 
values which they considered were below actual POD, until they reached a POD 
value where they had reservations (and placed a “?” against that value). The results 
were presented without any anonymity and were as follows (Table 3): 
 
Manual Ultrasonic inspection
POD
Inspection exceeds
HS BD JW RB
50% √ √ √ √
60% √ √ √ √
70% √ √ √ √
80% ? √ √ √
90% ? ? √
95% ? ?
Automated Ultrasonic inspection
POD
Inspection exceeds
HS BD JW RB
50% √ √ √ √
60% √ √ √ √
70% √ √ √ √
80% √ √ √ √
90% ? √ √ √
95% ? √ √  
Table 3 Direct Judgement for TJ2 (without confidence levels) 
 
Each member of the QB explained the reasoning behind their assessment. The QB 
members were then asked to quantify their confidence that the maximum POD values 
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 they had stated were lower bounds for inspection capability. They were as follows 
(Table 4): 
 
QB Member Manual Automated 
HS 95% 95% 
BD 90% 95% 
JW 80% 90% 
RB 80% 90% 
Table 4 Confidence levels for maximum PODs (TJ2) 
Following this discussion the QB members were asked to state what lower bound 
POD they judged corresponded to a confidence level of 95%, and a confidence level 
of 80%. The results are presented in Table 5a and Table 5b. 
 
Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 70% 60% 60% 70% 
80% 80% 90% 80% 90% 
Table 5a Lower bound PODs for different confidence levels (TJ2 manual) 
 
Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 80% 80% 90% 90% 
80% 90% 95% 95% 95% 
Table 5b Lower bound PODs for different confidence levels (TJ2 auto) 
 
It was decided not to try to achieve an overall QB consensus on the direct judgement 
POD values and confidences for TJ2. It could be left to RI-ISI analysis to decide e.g. 
whether to average values from QB members, or whether to adopt the most 
pessimistic values. It was noted that in any event there was reasonable consensus, 
with a lower bound POD of 85% ± 5% at 95% confidence level, for the automated UT 
procedure (lower bound POD 65% ± 5% at 95% confidence for manual). 
9.2.4.2 Use of Relationship between POD and Margin of Detection 
For ultrasonic inspection, as defect response increases above the reporting or noise 
level, it is to be expected that the probability of detecting and reporting defects will 
tend to increase. Understanding the relationship between this margin of detectability 
and the probability of detection / reporting could be a useful tool during inspection 
qualification, and could help to quantify the outcome. 
SKI have funded preliminary work by Doosan Babcock to investigate this relationship. 
A report on the work has been published on the SKI website [Ref. 5]. 
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 A document “Relationship between Probability of Reporting and Signal above Report 
Threshold” drawing on the results of this work was distributed to the QB members. A 
figure in the document illustrated a partly hypothetical graph relating the probability of 
an operator judging that a defect was above the report threshold, as a function of how 
high the signal actually was above the report threshold.  
According to TJ2, the signals from defects of concern should be significantly above 
the report threshold. The probability of reporting a detected defect was therefore high 
(above 95% according to the graph). If defects were not reported, it was therefore 
unlikely to be due to variations in setting report threshold or measuring defect signal 
amplitude. The reasons were more likely to be due to other human factors such as 
deviations from the specified scan pattern, couplant loss etc (as well as worst case 
combinations of defect size, roughness, skew etc.) 
It was therefore agreed that for this specific TJ, the relationship between probability of 
reporting and signal above threshold was not particularly useful. 
9.2.4.3 Use of Bayesian Methodology 
There was some general discussion before starting to apply the Bayesian 
Methodology.  
It was agreed that it would only be applied to the automated UT procedure. It was 
considered that determining the relative weights of the TJ (excluding trials information) 
and the trials information was a difficult step. It was also agreed that it was important 
to avoid ending up with an over-pessimistic value for POD due to taking into account 
very unlikely combinations of worst-case characteristics. It was difficult to know how to 
address the reduced detectability of worst case defects without knowledge of what 
proportion of the overall defect population they represented. For example if the 
requirement is to detect defects with skew between -5º and + 5º, then it might be 
reasonable to assume a Gaussian distribution within these limits. However this would 
mean that the proportion of defects at the limits of skew was almost zero, even though 
TJs often concentrate on worst case defects. 
The application of the Bayesian Methodology then started with the QB members 
deciding what the elements of the TJ were (excluding experimental evidence which 
was to be considered separately). After extensive discussion the elements of the TJ 
which were to be individually weighted and scored were selected as: 
a) Physical reasoning for non-worst case defects 
b) Modelling and physical reasoning relating to worst case defects 
c) Personnel 
d) Equipment 
It was agreed that the relative weights between a) and b) should reflect the relative 
proportions between non-worst case and worst case defects. 
Each QB member then stated what weight and score he gave to each of these TJ 
elements. These were as shown in Table 6a and Table 6b. 
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 TJ element HS BD JW RB 
a 40 40 40 50 
b 30 10 20 30 
c 20 25 20 10 
d 10 25 20 10 
Table 6a Weights for TJ2 elements 
 
TJ element HS BD JW RB 
a 1 1 1 1 
b 0.95 0.6 0.7 0.95 
c 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.95 
d 1 0.90 0.90 0.95 
Table 6b Scores for TJ2 elements 
 
The discussion moved on to how to weight and score the trials results. Two views 
emerged regarding what to count as the number of “hits.” One view was to take 
account of the number of times a defect was detected by different beams so that a 
defect detected by 3 different beams would count as separate 3 hits. The other view 
was to ignore this diversity of detection and only consider whether a defect had been 
detected overall, or completely missed. It was decided that for this current exercise, 
diversity of detection would be ignored (i.e. simply count number of defects detected) 
but it was recognised that this was an issue which would require further consideration 
in any future guidelines which were produced.. 
It was also agreed to consider any defect which had been detected with signal above 
record threshold as a “hit” without taking into account any margin by which the signal 
was above this threshold. 
During the weighting of the elements of the TJ, the average weighting ratio of the 
element relating to non-worst case defects (element a) to worst case (element b) was 
approximately 2.5. Since the trials presented results from 6 defects, the TJ could be 
considered equivalent to (2.5 x 6 non worst case defects) plus (6 worst case defects) 
= 21 defects. 
Lower bound POD for a given confidence level was then determined using a 
spreadsheet which performed the calculation according to the Bayesian methodology. 
The data entered into the spreadsheet were the TJ element scores and weights, the 
equivalence of the TJ to 21 defects in test piece trials, and 6 hits out of 6 in actual 
experimental. 
The results are presented in Table 7. 
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 Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 87% 82% 80% 87% 
80% 92% 88% 86% 92% 
Table 7  POD for TJ2 using Bayesian Methodology 
 
It was noted that there was reasonable consistency between the PODs from direct 
judgement (80% - 90% at 95% confidence) and that derived using the Bayesian 
Methodology (80% - 87% at 95% confidence). 
 
9.2.5 Quantification of TJ1 
9.2.5.1 Direct Judgement 
The QB members were provided with a copy of TJ1 together with a note which 
highlighted the differences between TJ1 and TJ2. The key difference was that all 
relevant experimentally measured and theoretically derived signal amplitudes from 
defects of concern were 4dB higher in TJ1 than TJ2, representing improved 
inspection capability. 
The QB members then each stated what they considered a lower bound POD to be, 
for 95% and 80% confidence levels, based on direct judgement. The results are 
presented in Table 8a and Table 8b. 
 
Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 80% 75% 70% 85% 
80% 90% 95% 90% 90% 
Table 8a Lower bound PODs for different confidence levels (TJ1 manual) 
 
Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 90% 90% 90% 90% 
80% 95% 99% 95% 95%→97.5% 
Table 8b Lower bound PODs for different confidence levels (TJ1 auto) 
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 9.2.5.2 Use of Relationship between POD and Margin of Detection 
It was agreed not to apply the relationship between probability of reporting and margin 
of detection to TJ1, for the reasons explained in 3.1.4.2 
9.2.5.3 Use of Bayesian Methodology 
As with TJ2, it was decided only to apply the Bayesian approach to automated UT. It 
was agreed that the weights of the elements in TJ1 would not differ from those for 
TJ2, nor would the relative weights of the TJ and the experimental trials change. 
The weights and scores for the TJ1 elements are presented in Table 9a and Table 9b. 
 
TJ element HS BD JW RB 
a 40 40 40 50 
b 30 10 20 30 
c 20 25 20 10 
d 10 25 20 10 
Table 9a Weights for TJ1 elements 
 
TJ element HS BD JW RB 
a 1 1 1 1 
b 0.95 0.9 0.9 0.97 
c 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.95 
d 1 0.90 0.9 0.95 
Table 9b Scores for TJ1 elements 
Lower bound POD for a given confidence level was then determined using a 
spreadsheet which performed the calculation according to the Bayesian methodology. 
The data entered into the spreadsheet were the TJ element scores and weights, the 
equivalence of the TJ to 21 defects in test piece trials, and 6 hits out of 6 in actual 
experimental. 
The results are presented in Table 10. 
 
Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 87% 85% 84% 87.5% 
80% 92.5% 91% 89.5% 92.5% 
Table 10 POD for TJ1 using Bayesian Methodology 
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 As with TJ2, there was reasonable consistency between the PODs from direct 
judgement (90% at 95% confidence) and that derived using the Bayesian 
Methodology (84% - 87.5% at 95% confidence). 
9.2.6 Debriefing Discussions 
After completing the quantification processes for the two TJs, a general discussion 
was held. It was suggested that a more appropriate method of applying the 
quantification methodologies might be to consider different categories of defect 
separately, and to determine POD separately for each. 
The QB would then state what the POD associated with each category of defect was 
(which could cover non-worst case defects, and different types of worst case defects) 
and it would be the responsibility of those performing the structural integrity analysis 
to make assumptions about the relative populations of these different categories. 
TJs could be constructed to facilitate the quantification process, and this could lead to 
further useful work within ENIQ (guidelines on how to construct such a TJ). It was 
recognised that the method of determining the relative weights of the TJ and trials 
when applying the Bayesian approach was not robust – the QB could have come up 
with a different method, or split the TJ into different elements 
It was considered in retrospect that it would have been better to split the TJ into 
different elements from those chosen. It was agreed that a suitable split (which could 
be generic) was: 
• Equipment 
• Personnel 
• Coverage 
• Detection margins 
• Evaluation 
• Independent evidence 
Overall, the pilot exercise was considered to have been a success even though 
further work was required to establish robust guidelines. 
9.3 2nd Pilot Study 
The purpose of the second pilot qualification study was the same as for the first pilot 
study (JRC Petten, August 2007), i.e. to study and as far as possible demonstrate 
approaches to quantifying the outcome from inspection qualification. Any appropriate 
lessons from the first pilot were to be taken into account. 
9.3.1 Preparation 
Two approaches were trialled: 
• Use of direct judgement to decide whether a simplified POD curve (e.g. a step 
function) can be considered as a lower bound for actual inspection capability. 
• Application of the Bayesian method. 
A technical justification (TJ3) was provided for the pilot by a Swedish organisation. 
This TJ was not from a real application but had been produced as an example of the 
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 scope and content of a TJ. This original TJ was edited in case there was a need to 
respect confidentiality of the organisation which provided the dossier.  
The following were issued to the members of the pilot qualification body before they 
convened for the study: 
• Technical Justification version TJ3 
• Draft Programme  
• Direct Judgement form for TJ3 to be independently completed and returned by 
the QB members before they convened.  
9.3.2 Programme 
The terms of reference, strategy for the pilot and roles of the participants were as for 
the first pilot study. The same participants were involved: 
The members of the qualification body were J Whittle as chairman (J Whittle & 
Associates), R Booler (Serco Assurance), H Söderstrand (SQC), B Dikstra (Doosan 
Babcock). 
The facilitators were L Gandossi (JRC), K Simola (VTT) and B Shepherd (Doosan 
Babcock). 
The pilot study lasted just under 2 days, including a short session to address any 
queries before starting the quantification process.  
9.3.3 Technical Justification and Preliminary Discussions 
TJ3 covered automated UT of a 36mm thick circumferential butt weld in a large 
diameter ferritic vessel.  
The contents of the TJ included among other things details of geometry, access, 
defects to be detected, physical reasoning to identify worst case defects, results of 
modelling to predict defect responses, and experimental evidence from trials on test 
pieces. 
It was noted that the TJ did not state anywhere that there was no requirement to 
detect lack of fusion. It was agreed that for the purpose of this study only the defects 
explicitly stated as requiring detection would be considered, although this highlighted 
the importance of clearly stating inspection objectives. 
It was also noted that there was an implicit assumption within the TJ that defects 
larger than the target size would be easier to detect but this was not always 
necessarily the case. It was commented that it was common to all TJs that the worst 
case defect be correctly determined and that when determining POD it is important to 
establish what the population covered. 
There was some discussion on whether for this study POD should mean probability of 
both detecting and correctly characterising a defect (since characterisation played a 
key role in TJ3). It was agreed to start off by quantifying only detection probability, and 
to address characterisation subsequently if there was enough time. 
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 One of the QB members stated that an issue he disliked in TJ3 was that the sizing 
tolerance was larger than the target defect size – in Sweden normal practice is to 
subtract the tolerance from the size which must be detected in order to establish the 
qualification size. However in this instance it was not important since the TJ was only 
an example. 
9.3.4 Quantification of TJ3 
9.3.4.1 Direct Judgement 
Each member of the QB had independently completed the direct judgement table. The 
TJ gave 18mm x 90mm as the qualification size. However virtually all the TJ data 
refers to the target size of 4mm x 20mm and so this was the basis of the POD 
assessment. 
The results were presented without any anonymity. The results are presented in Table 
11 below. 
Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 80% 80% 90% 90% 
80% 95% 90% 95% 95% 
Table 11 Lower bound PODs for different confidence levels (TJ3) 
The members of the QB then discussed their judgements. 
JW considered that the signal response should always be above the record threshold 
by a significant margin so that causes of failure would be mainly due to human factors 
in the analysis process. He was therefore 95% confident that POD would be at least 
90%. 
RB stated that for unskewed surface breaking smooth cracks the POD should be high 
but the cracks covered by this TJ could be rough and could be skewed, and there was 
not much detail in the TJ addressing these aspects. Surface form and coupling 
variations could also influence detection performance. He was therefore 90% 
confident that the POD was at least 90%, but was prepared to be more optimistic for 
the lower confidence of 80%. 
The main reason BD judged the POD to be lower than the above was because of the 
cavities in the surface caused by grinding. He considered the treatment in the TJ to be 
optimistic since it did not address loss of coupling or reduction in signal amplitude. 
There was no information on how widespread the cavities were. Also the tilt and skew 
ranges covered were quite large and the effects of these would become more 
significant with increasing defect size. Since only one probe was employed human 
factors would also be more significant. 
HS held similar views to BD, and considered that the combination of cavity and defect 
tilt could significantly reduce performance but overall was reasonably satisfied with 
potential inspection capability. 
JW commented that in a real case the QB would ask the utility for more information on 
surface condition. 
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 RB stated that he still felt uncomfortable concluding that 1 in 10 defects could be 
missed. BS replied that the POD score represented a minimum POD, e.g. reporting 
POD to be at least 90% (in the direct judgement table issued) could mean POD was 
considered to be between 90% and 95%. 
There seemed generally to be more psychological reluctance to judge POD as being 
above 95%, or to quantify it more precisely than ± 5%, than to judge that fewer than 
5% of defects would be missed, or to quantify the percentage of defects missed more 
precisely than ±5%. 
RB thought that more knowledge of the relative distributions of different classes of 
defects would result in more consistency between probability of detecting, and 
probability of not detecting, judgements. 
BS asked whether the approach adopted in the direct judgement table, whereby 
progressively higher POD’s are systematically ticked, helped to overcome initial 
reluctance to assign a POD to qualification results. HS confirmed it was useful. 
In response to a query from JW, BD replied that if the surface was smooth, he would 
judge the POD to be closer to 98% - 99%. 
HS said he viewed things a bit differently. During qualification, represented inspection 
conditions were generally good whereas a number of factors (environment, access, 
set-up etc) could reduce inspection effectiveness. He therefore took these issues into 
consideration when judging POD. BD agreed that the confidence from inspection 
qualification should not be oversold. However RB was of the opinion that all these 
potential negative factors should be taken into consideration during qualification. 
It was agreed that (as with the 1st pilot study) use of the relationship between POD 
and margin of detection was not appropriate for this TJ. 
9.3.4.2 Use of Bayesian Methodology 
It was agreed that a useful starting point for application of the Bayesian method would 
be to adopt the TJ elements established at the end of the first pilot. It was recognised 
that any future guidance on element selection should be applicable to all TJs.  
JW commented that since the trials in TJ3 were an integral part of the justification it 
would be difficult to consider them separately without destroying the logic of the rest of 
the TJ  
RB stated that he felt uncomfortable about adopting too rigorous an approach to 
weighting the TJ and trials – perhaps there was too much reluctance to rely on expert 
judgement. 
The elements of the TJ were agreed to be: 
• Equipment 
• Personnel 
• Coverage 
• Detection margin 
• Evaluation 
• On site application 
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 These were the proposed “generic elements” established during the 1st pilot debrief 
except that for element f “on site application” replaced “independent evidence”. (It was 
not clear what had been meant by “independent evidence” but RB thought it might 
influence other elements such as choice of probes, so not independent.) 
There was a general discussion on the approach to determining weights, scores, and 
equivalent number of practical trials. Each member of the QB then stated what they 
judged the weight/score for each of the above elements to be. The results are 
presented in Table 12 below. 
 
TJ element HS BD JW RB 
a 20/1 20/1 15/1 10/1 
b 10/0.9 10/1 15/0.9 5/1 
c 20/0.9 20/0.8 15/0.7 15/0.9 
d 35/1 20/0.75 40/1 60/1 
e 5/0.95 20/0.9 5/0.7 5/0.8 
f 10/0.95 10/0.7 10/0.7 5/1 
Table 12 Weights and scores for TJ3 elements 
The reasons for the above weights/scores were then discussed (In some cases QB 
members revised their judgements during the discussion. Table 12 presents the final 
figures). 
RB weighted element d (detection margin) highly since he considered it the most 
significant issue in the TJ – as long as there was good coverage other issues 
shouldn’t be particularly important. Neither modelling nor trials included rough defects. 
LG confirmed to RB that in that case weight is reduced. 
BD stated he found himself getting confused over 
1. volume of evidence 
2. how convincing the evidence was 
3. relative importance of the issue 
4. impact on inspection 
This prompted further discussion on how to determine weights and scores. JW 
commented that if information is missing in an element, this would reduce its weight 
but this would result in other elements being weighted more highly. RB stated that if 
e.g. information is missing on rough defects, this doesn’t mean that the score should 
be reduced since there is no evidence that rough defects would be missed. 
BD stated that this was why he was of the opinion that weights should not add up to 
100%, but to some figure which represented the total amount of supporting 
information within the TJ. 
The QB members considered it difficult to decide how many equivalent trials the TJ 
was worth. The sensitivity of the probability distribution curve to different equivalent 
trials figures was studied as a means of selecting a figure which appeared to give 
sensible results. BD expressed concern over selecting a figure which appeared to 
give the desired answer, although RB stated that there didn’t appear to be an 
alternative. 
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 HS commented that he found the Bayesian approach a useful statistical tool for 
helping to decide the relative balance between a TJ and trials in order to achieve a 
specific level of confidence in a specific POD. 
RB felt that further guidance was required on how to determine the equivalent number 
of trials. Although he supported the development of these quantification approaches it 
was important that they be robust enough to convince those in the qualification 
industry of their potential value. 
KS stated that there still appeared to be confusion over what was meant by weight 
and score. She thought that it would be appropriate to have some method of 
comparing the weight of an element to its “ideal”. 
At the start of the 2nd day of the pilot study, BD gave a short presentation he had 
prepared, prompted by some of the problematic issues which had arisen on equating 
the TJ to a number of equivalent trials.  
The approach which BD described was based on considering the probability that a 
defect claimed to be detectable would actually be detected. A quantitative estimate 
could be made by looking at the detection margin between the predicted signal 
amplitude and the reporting threshold. This detection margin is in practice reduced by 
uncertainty in the setting of the threshold. 
Since this uncertainty should normally be quantified in the TJ it should be possible to 
estimate the probability of failing to detect a given defect as a result of the threshold 
uncertainty exceeding the detection margin. The reciprocal of this probability would 
give an estimate of the number of trials for one detection failure. This could then be 
the basis of the number of trials equivalent to the TJ in the Bayesian analysis.  
The analysis could take account of uncertainty in the reporting process as well as in 
the setting of the threshold. In the case of manual UT, this has already been studied 
experimentally (SKI funded work on relation between probability of detecting / 
reporting and margin of detection) so that quantitative information is available. For 
automated UT, a simple allowance might be made for the margin necessary for the 
analyst always to register the presence of a reportable indication.  
RB pointed out that the reporting criteria for automated UT may often include factors 
other than amplitude (e.g. the extent of the plotted UT indication in one or more 
dimensions) so that a quantitative analysis might be difficult.  
In further discussion it was recognised that arguments of the type presented might 
alternatively provide a means of scoring the TJ (or some of its elements). This line of 
argument could not however be used to both score the TJ and weight it relative to 
experimental trials. 
The QB members felt that there was still confusion over what was meant by weights / 
scores, and the differences in these figures from the different members was probably 
due to different interpretations of these factors rather than significant differences of 
opinion on the effectiveness of the inspection embodied in the TJ. Strong guidance 
was needed. 
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 RB suggested that it could be useful to validate the methodology and guidance by 
performing the Bayesian analysis on a simple procedure / TJ then performing practical 
trials to measure POD. 
JW stated that there was also a need to establish how to deal with missing information 
since different views had emerged on this. 
KS replied that she liked the concept of establishing what weights the TJ would have if 
it was perfect, and then marking the weights down where information was missing. HS 
commented that there might be a good chance of getting further funding to develop 
and validate more detailed guidance. 
BS commented that if an individual element indicated a limitation in inspection 
capability, e.g. a limitation due to incomplete coverage, then this should represent a 
lower bound for overall capability. Thus if coverage was 75% then this should be an 
upper bound for POD to reflect this weak link in the chain. With the current 
methodology this limitation would appear to be “diluted” by the other elements – 
possibly there should be some means of multiplying (or convoluting) factors 
representing the score of the individual elements. 
JW replied that shortcomings in inspection capability tended to be due to either 
“massive” errors (blunders) or statistical variations. KS stated that it had been 
assumed that the elements were truly independent. 
RB felt that the biggest conceptual leap was equating the TJ to a number of 
equivalent practical trials, but LG pointed out that this was a fundamental requirement 
of the methodology. BS stated that it might help to consider how much evidence from 
trials would be required, in order for the trials to be an adequate substitute for the TJ. 
RB and HS said that even though there remained issues to be resolved before 
applying the methodology for real qualifications, they had already found the 
quantification concepts being studied under this project useful in stimulating more 
critical consideration of TJs and implicit assumptions in them. 
Each of the QB members then stated how many equivalent trials they considered TJ3 
to be worth. The results are presented in Table 13. 
 
 HS BD JW RB 
Equivalent Trials 65 100 25 15 
Table 13 TJ3 equivalent trials 
 
The QB members then discussed their views (in some cases QB members revised 
their judgements during the discussion. Table 13 above shows the final figures).  
BD had approached this from an order of magnitude perspective since it was difficult 
to be precise. He considered a good TJ (which this was) to certainly be worth more 
than 10 trials but did not consider TJ3 to be worth more than 100. 
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 HS had imagined how he would design trials. He would want to include defects at the 
two extremities of tilt, the two extremities of skew, would want to include the effects of 
cavities etc. and then would want around 6 or 7 defects for each category. 
JW felt that the evidence in the TJ which provides the most useful information was 
from the 14 defects for which results are provided, so on this basis the TJ was worth 
14 which was then increased to 25 to allow for the fact that the defect designs were 
influenced by information in the rest of the TJ. 
He asked BD whether, according to this logic, he thought that the extra information in 
the TJ was equivalent to trials on around 85 defects (100 minus the actual trials 
reported). BD confirmed that he thought so, bearing in mind he was adopting an order 
of magnitude approach. JW stated that the TJ addresses the limits of e.g. tilt and 
skew without taking into consideration whether these are worst cases. 
RB had considered how many trials and successful detections would be required to 
generate the same POD and associated confidence as the TJ was judged to. To 
achieve a 95% confidence that POD was 95% would require around 50 defects. 
However there was a lack of information in the TJ, for example insufficient treatment 
of rough defects, so he considered the TJ to be equivalent to 15 defects, all detected. 
He said that in BD’s case, 100 trials would provide high confidence in POD, and 
further information would not be required, but this was not the case (since there was a 
lack of information on rough defects). 
This prompted discussion which concluded that the equivalent number of trials should 
be the equivalent number of defects, not just the number of successful detections. 
The weights, scores and equivalent trials figures for the QB members were then 
entered into a MATLAB programme which LG had prepared to calculate POD as a 
function of confidence level. The results are presented in Figure 16 and Table 14. 
After the meeting, LG also provided results based on a figure of 25 equivalent trials for 
all QB members. These are presented in Figure 17 and Table 15. 
 
Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 90% 79% 75% 78% 
80% 93% 82% 81% 87% 
Table 14 Bayesian analysis (different equivalent trials) 
 
Confidence HS BD JW RB 
95% 83% 70% 75% 85% 
80% 89% 77% 81% 91% 
Table 15 Bayesian analysis (25 equivalent trials) 
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Figure 16 Bayesian quantification results for TJ3 (different equivalent trials) 
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Figure 17 Bayesian quantification results for TJ3 (25 equivalent trials). 
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 9.3.5 General Discussion 
After completing the quantification processes for TJ3, a general discussion was held.  
RB pointed out that the four members of the QB had come up with four different POD 
assessments and asked how expert elicitation could be used to come up with a 
consensus. KS replied that although one approach would be for QB members to work 
together to agree figures, the simplest way would be to use an average. 
BS drew attention to the previous comment made, that the differences were possibly 
due to differences in interpreting how to weight / score / decide equivalent trials rather 
than fundamental differences in opinion on the effectiveness of the inspection. It was 
agreed that more detailed guidance was needed.  
RB stated that it would probably be better for QB members to work together to 
establish figures, rather than decide figures independently (as done in these pilots) 
since there could be an inclination to defend ones own figures. He thought that a 
follow on pilot based on this approach could be very useful, since the combination of 
the methodologies applied during the first two pilots, with expect elicitation, could be 
powerful. 
HS stated that in Sweden that close teamwork was adopted whenever possible, and 
agreement is reached before qualification on which expert should concentrate on 
what. 
 
10 EXAMPLE OF THE OVERAL PROCESS 
Previous sections have described how a simplified POD curve might be used to 
represent inspection capability (Section 5), how this simplified POD curve could be 
used as the target (or output) from inspection qualification (Sections 6 and 7), and 
how POD, risk reduction and inspection interval can be linked (Section 8). 
This section provides an example of the overall process which could be used to link 
RI-ISI and inspection qualification. The example is for illustrative purposes only, and 
no further conclusion should be made based on the numerical results in this example. 
Results depend on assumptions made on the structural properties and loads, 
assumed degradation mechanism, and on the number and definitions of the states in 
the Markov model (see Section 8.1).  
In this example the components to be inspected are circumferential butt welds in 
ferritic steel. The welds are 36mm thick. The loading conditions and material 
properties are known and there is a postulated defect initiation and growth 
mechanism. From metallurgical considerations, a description of these potential 
defects can be provided (possible locations, orientations, roughness etc). The 
dimensions of the component and the growth mechanism correspond to the 
information available for the 2nd pilot study, summarised in Section 9.2. 
Based on initial (non rigorous) opinions of NDT personnel, a reasonable target for 
inspection capability might be detection of potential defects exceeding 4mm 
throughwall extent and 20mm length with a POD of 95%. 
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 The first step is to model defect initiation and growth, and to calculate the yearly 
rupture probabilities with and without inspection. This can be done using the approach 
described in Section 8. An inspection interval of 10 years is initially assumed. 
The development of the yearly rupture probability is shown in Figure 18 both in the 
case of no inspections and in the case where the component is inspected at 10 year 
intervals with a 95% POD. The analysis indicates that with the inspection interval of 
10 years the average failure probability (over the plant life) is reduced to 6.8E-7 from 
6.0E-5 in a situation without any inspections. In terms of the risk reduction measure 
determined in Section 5, this corresponds to 98.9. In this example, we set the 
inspection requirement at about this level, i.e. the failure probability should be reduced 
by about 99%. Note that this is a requirement where the entire lifetime of the 
component is considered, and it implies several successive inspections.  
The average risk reduction is not the only possible way to define the inspection target. 
Alternatively, the requirement could be set as a fixed average rupture frequency 
target, or even the maximum allowed yearly rupture probability (i.e. the peak values of 
the dotted line in Fig. 18). 
The inspection requirements are then provided to the organisation which will perform 
the inspection: normally either the utility’s internal NDT department, or a potential 
inspection vendor. These requirements state that automated ultrasonic inspection is 
required in order to maximise reliability. Having developed or identified the proposed 
inspection system (procedure + equipment + personnel), it is then subject to 
inspection qualification. 
 
Figure 18 Yearly rupture probability with no inspections (solid line) and with 
POD = 0.95 at 10 year inspection interval (dotted line). 
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 The inspection qualification body is given the task of determining whether defects 
which meet the defect description (location, orientation, roughness, etc) and which 
exceed 4mm through wall dimension and 20mm length can be detected with a POD of 
95%. In order to provide improved transparency of the qualification process, the 
qualification body is instructed to employ the Bayesian methodology instead of direct 
judgement. The associated confidence level is also requested. 
The inspection qualification body then attempts to quantify inspection capability, using 
one or more of the approaches described in Sections 6 and 7. In this example, the 
task is the same as one which was set in the 2nd pilot qualification study described in 
Section 9.1 
We can therefore consider that a realistic outcome would be that the qualification 
body concludes that the POD 95% is not achievable by the proposed inspection 
system. The qualification body concludes that there is 95% confidence that the POD 
for the specified defects is at least 75% (see Section 9.2) 
As the initially expected 95% POD could not be reached, the inspection interval 
should be adjusted to meet the initial criterion of reaching an average risk reduction of 
99%. The analysis shows that given the POD of 0.75, an inspection interval of 5 years 
can be accepted. Also the 6 year interval results in a failure frequency very close to 
the criterion. Table 16 summarises the results for three different PODs and several 
inspection intervals. The red cell alternatives with risk reduction below 98.5% could be 
considered unacceptable. 
 
Interval (y) POD = 90% POD = 80% POD = 75% 
 rupt. /y R rupt. /y R rupt. /y R 
5   3.2E-7 99.5 5.0E-7 99.2 
6   5.9E-7 99.0 9.0E-7 98.5 
7 3.6E-7 99.4 9.6E-7 98.4 1.4E-6 97.7 
8 5.7E-7 99.1 1.4E-6 97.7   
9 8.4E-7 98.6     
Table 16 Average rupture frequency (1/y) and the risk reduction percentage 
(R) for different PODs and inspection intervals  
 
Figure 19 shows the yearly rupture probability for inspection interval 5 years and POD 
= 0.75. Also the case of no inspections is shown. 
It is much easier to qualify against a simple step function POD, than to a more 
complex function. In Section 5 the sensitivity of the failure probability to the POD as a 
function of a set of assumptions (flaw size distribution, failure probability given a flaw 
size, form of POD) was illustrated. Here we study if, given the assumption made for 
the probabilistic fracture mechanic analysis in this example, providing more 
information on the detection capability of small defects would have a notable effect on 
the failure probability. 
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 Instead of assuming no detection of any flaw smaller than 4 mm deep, it is assumed 
that defects between 2mm and 4mm are detected with 50% probability. In the case of 
POD = 75% for defects deeper than 4mm and 6 y interval, the risk reduction changes 
from 98.5% to 90.0%, and in the case of 7 y interval from 97.7 to 98.3. Even if the risk 
reduction improves slightly, this would not have a significant impact on the acceptable 
inspection interval. 
 
Figure 19 Yearly rupture probability with no inspections (solid line) and with 
POD = 0.75 at 5 year inspection interval (dotted line). 
As a last point, let us assume that the main reason for the relatively low 75% POD 
according to the QB would be the detectability of the small defects close to the 
detection target. The QB would be confident that if the target detection size was set to 
12mm, the POD would be the initially expected 95%. In this case, assuming that 
defects smaller than 12mm are not detected, the risk reduction target is achieved with 
a 6 y inspection interval. 
 
11 CONCLUSIONS  
The four main objectives of the project (see Section 3) were achieved. Each is 
reviewed in turn below. 
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 11.1 Investigate Quantification Approaches  
Approaches to quantifying the outcome from inspection qualification have been 
investigated and are described in Sections 5, 6 and 7. These are based on the use of 
a simplified POD curve (typically a step curve) to represent inspection effectiveness. 
The work described in Section 5 has allowed sensitivity of risk reduction to the details 
of the POD curve to be investigated. Although the model which was the basis for this 
work is relatively simple, it provides a useful insight into the conditions under which a 
step POD curve could be adopted. It also illustrates the extent to which risk is 
sensitive to the plateau POD level in the step curve, and the defect size at which that 
plateau is reached (equivalent to defect qualification size). This approach can help 
achieve an appropriate balance between risk reduction and the effort involved in 
designing and qualifying an inspection system. 
It should be noted that this work has studied relative risk reduction, i.e. the factor by 
which risk is reduced by inspection. A small relative risk reduction in a high risk 
component could be more beneficial than a high relative risk reduction in a low risk 
component. 
The results of this work indicated that relative risk reduction was least sensitive to the 
detail of the POD curve for tough materials containing only relatively small defects 
(typical of nuclear applications).  
Inspection quantification methods were developed based on direct judgement 
(Section 6), and a Bayesian approach (Section 7). 
Direct judgement would involve the qualification body deciding whether, on the basis 
of all the information provided, they considered that a target POD curve represents a 
lower bound for actual inspection capability. Alternatively the qualification body could 
be asked to define a lower bound for the POD curve. In either case the task of the 
qualification body will be more difficult the greater the detail in the POD curve, the 
higher the maximum POD in the curve, and the lower the defect size (qualification 
size) corresponding the maximum POD. 
A useful tool in making this judgement could be the relationship between POD and 
margin of detection (signal to report threshold, or signal to noise level) as described in 
Section 6.  
The Bayesian approach is based on reviewing the Technical Justification and 
expressing the resulting (qualitative) degree of belief in inspection capability in 
probabilistic terms, by equating it to an equivalent number of trials and successes. 
This is then combined with the number of trials and successes from practical trials, 
after judging the relative weight of information from the TJ and from the trials.  
 
11.2 Produce Guidelines  
Practical guidelines on the application of these quantification methods were produced. 
The guidelines for direct judgement are relatively straightforward and are essentially 
the whole of Section 6. The Bayesian approach is more complex. While the technical 
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 approach is explained in Section 7 (and in more detail in Ref 6), separate guidelines 
which were finalised after the pilot studies are provided in Annex 1. 
Section 8 illustrates how it can be possible to study the relation between the outcome 
from the qualification process (as expressed by a POD), risk reduction and inspection 
interval. Note that this requires knowledge of defect initiation and growth. The 
examples are based on a model developed at VTT combining probabilistic crack 
growth analysis with a discrete Markov process for inspection modelling. Alternative 
suitable probabilistic fracture mechanics tools could be used as well, provided they 
allow the modelling of inspection reliability. Section 10 provides an example of linking 
POD, risk reduction and inspection interval based on the 2nd pilot study. 
 
11.3 Pilot Studies  
The two pilot qualification studies were performed and were very useful in 
demonstrating the application of the quantification methods in practice, identifying 
issues which should be addressed in the final guidelines, and highlighting areas 
where further work was required. It should be noted that both pilots were on ferritic 
welds. Other issues might have arisen in the case of austenitic welds, where there 
can be additional complications for inspection and qualification. 
The application of the direct judgement guidelines was straightforward. There was 
reasonable consistency between the POD judgements of the individual qualification 
body members, both at 80% confidence and at 95% confidence.  
The use of the relationship between POD and margin of detection was not considered 
useful for the pilot applications since failure to detect defects was unlikely to be due to 
low signals. Such failures were instead judged to be more likely associated with 
aspects such as human factors, surface condition, uncertainties over whether worst 
case defects had been adequately defined etc. However it was concluded that this 
relationship could still be useful when the margin of detection is low, as is often the 
case for austenitic welds.  
The trials of the Bayesian approach highlighted a number of issues. These included 
some which have now been addressed in the Annex 1 guidelines, and some which 
require further work (or at least should be drawn to the attention of those who intend 
applying the methodology). The main issues were: 
1) It was evident that there were different interpretations among the qualification 
board members of the meanings of TJ element score and weight, and (in the 
case of the 2nd pilot) widely differing views on the relative weights of the TJ 
and trials. It was concluded that careful guidance is required (e.g. in written 
guidelines, during training, when facilitating the application of this method) to 
ensure correct and consistent interpretation and application of the method. 
The Guidelines in Annex 1 address these issues as far as practicable. 
However it is ultimately a matter of expert judgement what scores / weights are 
attributed – it is not possible to be prescriptive on this. 
2) A TJ can contain two different types of independent information, which must 
be treated differently. 
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 One type is “stand-alone” information from which POD can be inferred (even if 
with low confidence). Examples are previous trials results, and results from 
modelling. If each of these independently indicates a POD of e.g. 90%, these 
elements support each other so there is increased confidence that POD is 
90%. 
The other type is “limiting factor” information. Examples are reduction in POD 
due to coverage, and reduced reliability due to human factors. Reductions in 
POD due to each of these are cumulative, e.g. if coverage is only 90% and 
personnel only identify and correctly interpret defect signals 90% of the time, 
these two factors will be cumulative and will limit POD to a maximum of 81%.  
The Guidelines in Annex 1 address this issue. 
3) Ultrasonic detection capability depends on a variety of defect features such as 
orientation, roughness, location etc. It can be difficult to conclude a POD for 
the overall defect population without information on the relative likelihoods of 
different classes of defects being present. TJs and practical trials often 
concentrate on “worst case” defects, i.e. those predicted to be most difficult to 
detect. Determining POD based solely on these can lead to undue pessimism 
for the defect population as a whole. It may be appropriate to determine 
separate PODs for separate populations of defects, but knowledge of the 
overall POD would still require knowledge of the relative proportions of these 
populations.  
4) Careful consideration is required regarding what is counted as successful 
detection in practical trials results. If the inspection system is based on 
application of several scans and defects are detected by more than one scan 
(e.g. 6 defects each detected by each of 4 different applied probes) a decision 
is required on whether this represents 6 successful detections or 24. 
5) Consideration is required regarding whether / how to take account of the 
margin of detection for defects during trials. In the current methodology, there 
is no distinction between only just detecting defects in trials, and detecting 
them very easily (high signal to report threshold). 
6) The methodology does not address accuracy of sizing (a defect could be 
detected but not reported if undersized) or how to treat false calls. 
 
11.4 Forum for Discussion 
There have been very useful discussions on the approaches investigated and the 
guidelines developed throughout the project. These discussions have involved: 
• The three organisations mainly involved in performing the work (Doosan 
Babcock, JRC, VTT) 
• The members of the pilot qualification body 
• The sponsors of the project 
• ENIQ Steering Committee and TGR  
 54 
 12 RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. When quantifying the outcome from inspection qualification it is important to 
consider carefully the full population of defects to be detected. Technical 
justifications and practical trials may concentrate on “worst case” defects, i.e. 
those which are predicted to be most difficult to detect. The POD for this 
category of defect is likely to be lower than the full population (worst case + 
non worst case). A POD based solely on consideration of worst case defects 
may therefore be an unduly pessimistic judgement of overall POD. There may 
be occasions where it is useful to consider POD separately for different 
categories of defect. 
2. Defect specifications for qualification usually define ranges for certain 
parameters of the defect such as tilt, skew, roughness, location, etc. It would 
be useful to know how these parameters are distributed. For example if the 
specified skew range is between +5º and -5º, it would be useful to know 
whether skew is equally likely to be any value within this range, or whether 
likelihood decreases towards extreme values. 
Having such information would help to determine a more accurate POD as 
explained under point 1 above. Note that this information would also be useful 
even if qualification outcome is not being quantified, because excessive effort 
can be involved in trying to detect defects at worst case combinations of skew, 
tilt, roughness etc when in fact the likelihood of such defects existing may be 
vanishingly small. 
It is therefore recommended that work is undertaken to study how such defect 
parameters are likely to be distributed in reality. 
3. Application of the direct judgement process to determine POD as a step curve 
is relatively straightforward. In principle the simplification of the POD curve in 
this manner is no different from the common practice of qualifying against a 
single defect size with no explicit requirements for detection of defects below 
that size. 
However it can still be useful to consider the relation between risk reduction 
and details of the POD curve, since even in the case of a step curve this can 
help achieve an appropriate balance between risk reduction and the difficulty 
of meeting specific qualification targets (defect qualification size and POD). 
4. Further work to establish a more rigorous relation between margin of detection 
and POD is recommended since this would be a useful tool to support direct 
judgement in the case where detection margin is low e.g. austenitic welds 
(stainless steel and Inconel) or complex geometries – see Section 6 and Ref 
(5). 
5. Linking POD, risk reduction and inspection interval requires knowledge of 
defect initiation and growth. Sections 8 and 10 of this report illustrate this 
process using relatively simple models and assumptions. For formal 
application, more detailed models are likely to be required including 
consideration of repair criteria (a simplifying assumption was that all detected 
defects were repaired). 
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 6. The guidelines in Annex 1 provide a good starting point for those considering 
application of the Bayesian approach. However further work is recommended 
to make the application more robust in practice. In particular the issues 
identified in Section 11.3 should be addressed and this may require further 
pilot applications. 
7. Consideration should be given to how to construct a TJ to facilitate 
quantification. This could involve for example organising the TJ so that the 
“stand-alone elements” and “limiting factors” (see Section 11.3 and Annex 1) 
are explicitly identified and discussed. 
8. It is recommended that opportunities are sought to trial the quantification 
approaches described in parallel with formal qualification exercises on real 
plant. Even if the quantification data generated are not used for formal 
purposes, the lessons learnt from such trials would be extremely useful. 
9. ENIQ could play an important role in taking forward some of these 
recommendations. In particular further work is recommended on the Bayesian 
Guidelines in Annex 1, with a view to them potentially becoming a formal ENIQ 
document. Such work could be performed jointly by an ad-hoc group of 
members from ENIQ TGR and TGQ.  
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ANNEX 1: GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION OF BAYESIAN 
METHODOLOGY 
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 1) Organisation as expert elicitation process. 
 
1.a) It is recommended that the quantification of a Technical Justification is 
organised as a structured expert elicitation exercise.
 
The process of formal expert judgement usually consists of the following steps: 
 
1) Definition of the issues about which the expert judgements should be made. 
2) Training of the experts and definition of variables to be elicited. 
3) Individual work of experts. 
4) Elicitation (drawing out the opinions of the experts) 
5) Analysis and aggregation of results and, in case of disagreement, attempt to 
resolve differences. 
6) Documentation of results, including expert reasoning in support of their 
judgement. 
 
More information and additional references can for instance be found in [Ref 9]  
 
 
1.b) The panel should have at least 4 members 
In order to ensure a sufficiently broad representation of expert opinion, it is 
recommended that the panel has at least 4 members.  One of them will be the 
facilitator who should be knowledgeable in the field of subjective probability, and 
should have a thorough knowledge of the methodology, of the meaning of all the 
relevant concepts and of all its potential shortcomings.  The facilitator should be 
satisfied that the other panel members have received sufficient training in the 
methodology, and is responsible for the process of elicitation, aggregation and 
final reporting of the case.  It is preferable that the facilitator does not contribute 
an expert judgement in order to ensure objectivity during the elicitation process 
 
One panel member should act as a chairperson. The main role of the 
chairperson is to help the panel achieving a consensus. 
 
 
1.c) The whole process should be thoroughly documented.
 
The documentation should include, as a minimum, a description of the panel 
participants (name and summary of the relevant expertise), minutes of all the 
relevant discussions, the quantities elicited, and a thorough description of the 
method used to combine the judgments of the various experts. 
 
2) Training 
 
2.a) The following topics should be covered:
 
• Short introduction to expert judgement: what it is, how it works, and what 
are the common biases encountered when experts are giving judgements 
under uncertainty. 
• General concepts of probability. 
• Bayesian methodology for the quantification of ENIQ methodology. 
• A worked example of the Bayesian methodology  
• An exercise on the elicitation of uncertain quantities. 
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2.b) It is essential that the technical experts are thoroughly briefed regarding what 
kind of judgements they will required to give and how the model works.  
 
In particular, concepts such as "independent element", "weight" and "score" can 
be prone to misunderstandings. We therefore recommend that an adequate 
amount of time during the training is spent to make sure that there is a correct 
(and common) understanding among the technical experts. 
 
2c) Extent of training 
 
 Technical experts should have had at least two full days training to ensure the 
above are covered sufficiently. 
 
 
3) Recommended method for the quantification of an ENIQ TJ 
 
3.a) “Approach 1” described in [Ref. 7] is recommended.  The main steps are as 
follows. 
 
1. The approach is based on quantifying the outcome from inspection 
qualification using Bayesian statistics. The purpose is to produce a 
quantitative estimate of the probability of detection based on the combined 
information of the TJ and practical trials. 
 
2. The fundamental idea is to treat the TJ as a set of “equivalent” practical 
trials. Thus, all the relevant evidence on inspection capability contained in 
the TJ is seen as actually equivalent to performing a number of trials.  
 
3. The probability of detection p (for a specified population of defects, see 
"4 - Defect population & splitting of the evaluation") is described using a 
Beta-Binomial model. In other words, finding a defect is modelled as a 
Bernoulli trial, with success probability p. In turn, the parameter p is modelled 
as a random variable and the uncertainty related to it is expressed with a 
Beta probability distribution.  
 
 p ∼ Beta (α, β)  
 
α and β are the parameters of the Beta distribution, describing the current 
knowledge about p. 
 
4. If an experiment is carried out, consisting of a set of N trials (i.e. the NDE 
system at hand is applied to a set of N flaws), Ns of such flaws will be 
detected (successes) and Nf=N-Ns will be missed (failures). A new 
(posterior) distribution can be obtained by simply adding Ns to α and Nf to β. 
 
 αpost= αprior+Ns 
 
 βpost= βprior+Nf = βprior+N-Ns
 
 
5. The TJ is interpreted in terms of an equivalent set of practical trials. In 
Approach 1, the TJ is quantified using two numbers (see Figure next page):  
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 • an equivalent total number of trials, NTJ, and  
• an equivalent number of successes, NTJ,s.  
 
6. These numbers are elicited from the experts in a documented and 
transparent manner, and are then used in combination with the number of 
practical trials, Ntrials, (and associated number of successes, Ntrials,s) to 
determine (or prove, according to the specific application) the achievement 
of the qualification capability (or objectives). 
 
  Before beginning of qualification exercise
Analyse practical trials results 
• number of trials, N trials • number of successes, N trials, s 
Prove that target has been achieved 
Associate to TJ:   • equivalent number of trials, NTJ • equivalent number of successes,NTJ, s 
No knowledge, uniform prior (αprior=1, β prior =1)   
Determine posterior parameters reflecting TJ 
strength:
• αTJ = αprior+ NTJ, s • βTJ = βprior+ (NTJ - NTJ, s) 
Perform TJ   
Determine final posterior parameters:   • αpost = αTJ+ Ntrials, s • βpost = βTJ+ (Ntrials – Ntrials, s)  
Determine point estimates (mode, mean) and 
interval estimates (lower bound confidence 
intervals) for probability of detection, p .  
 
Figure A1 Principle for combining evidence from TJ and practical trials 
to prove that reliability target is achieved. 
 
7. Approach 1 is based on quantifying the technical justification in terms of 
score and weight. 
 
If some evidence is missing, this should imply less weight for the TJ. This 
means that the equivalent TJ sample size, NTJ, should be smaller than in the 
case of stronger evidence. 
 
If evidence is present showing that some defects could be missed, this 
should imply a lower expected score of the TJ, i.e. the ratio of NTJ,s over NTJ 
should be smaller than in the case where the evidence is more supportive 
regarding detection capability. 
 
 
8. The problem is thus reduced to the determination of the two numbers NTJ 
and NTJ,s and how to weight the evidence in the TJ with respect to the trials. 
 
The user must be particularly aware of the fact that these two numbers are 
ultimately a matter of expert judgement. 
 
If the expert(s) involved in the process feel confident enough, they can 
provide such numbers directly. However, it is recommended to break down 
the TJ into elements, as suggested in [Ref. 6] and [Ref. 7]. 
 
9. If the TJ is broken down into elements, the next step is to define weighting 
and scoring principles for the quantification. Weighting is associated with the 
determination of NTJ, i.e. the relative weight that the technical justification 
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 has when compared with the practical trials. Scoring is associated with the 
determination of NTJ,s, i.e. the judgement of the extent to which the TJ 
supports 100% detection 
 
 
Element 1
Total equivalent sample size
NTJ, N(TJ, successes)
TJ Trials
Element 2
Element 3
Element 4 R
el
at
iv
e 
w
ei
gh
ts
Qualitative evidence Quantitative evidence
Score Ele. 1
Score Ele. 2
Score Ele. 3
Score Ele. 4
A number of “hits”
out on N trials
 
Figure A2 Weighting and scoring of TJ elements 
 
10. The final posterior parameters are obtained as 
 
 αpost= 1 + NTJ,s + Ntrials,s 
 
 βpost= 1 + (NTJ - NTJ,s) + ( Ntrials - Ntrials,s) 
 
 
And the knowledge about p is fully expressed by the posterior distribution: 
 
 p ∼ Beta(αpost, βpost)  
 
This function can then be used to extract the required information (mean, 
mode, confidence intervals, etc.) 
 
 
3.b) The user should be particularly aware of the complexities related to identifying 
the elements in which the TJ is to be broken down, see "5 - Selection of 
elements" below. 
 
 
4) Defect population & splitting of the evaluation 
 
4.a) The overall defect population for which POD is required will generally be all 
defects which meet the qualification specification.  Thus the population typically 
covers all defects exceeding specified dimensions and which lie within specified 
ranges for tilt, skew, location, morphology etc.  It should be borne in mind 
however that certain categories of defect (in terms of how these parameters 
combine) are likely to be easier to detect than others.  For example technical 
justifications and practical trials often concentrate on worst case defects, i.e. 
those predicted to be most difficult to detect.  The POD for this category of 
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 defect is likely to be lower (by definition) than for the whole population (worst 
case + non worst case).  A POD based solely on consideration of worst case 
defects may therefore be an unduly pessimistic judgement of overall POD. 
 
4.b) There may therefore be occasions when it is useful to split the overall population 
into different categories of defect and to determine POD separately for each.  
Note however that combining the results to derive an overall POD will require 
prediction of the relative proportions of defects within these different categories.  
This in turn will require knowledge or assumptions regarding how parameters 
such as tilt, skew etc are distributed within the specified tolerance bands.  It is 
likely to be more appropriate for the combination of PODs for different 
categories of defect to be made by structural reliability specialists rather 
inspection qualification personnel. 
 
 
5) Break down of TJ and selection of elements 
 
5.a) In principle the judgement of the TJ in terms of an equivalent number of 
successful trials and successes could be made in a single step. However it is 
recommended that this judgement is made in a structured and transparent 
manner by breaking down the TJ into separate independent sources of 
evidence. These independent sources of evidence can fall into one of two 
categories: stand-alone elements (5.b) and limiting factors (5.c). 
 
5.b) Stand-alone elements.
 
One category is “stand-alone” information from which POD can be inferred 
(even if with low confidence). Examples are previous trials results, and results 
from modelling. If each of these independently indicates a POD of e.g. 90%, 
these elements support each other so there is increased confidence that POD is 
90%. 
 
Each of the stand-alone elements within the TJ should be given a score 
corresponding to the extent to which it points towards 100% detection, and a 
weighting which reflects the relative value of the evidence it provides.  For 
example if evidence from modelling suggests that 9 out of 10 defects will be 
detected the score would be 0.9 and if this modelling evidence is judged to 
contribute (in terms of value of the evidence) 40% of the total evidence within 
the TJ, its weight would be 0.4. The weighted score for this element would then 
be 0.9 x 0.4 = 0.36. 
 
The weighted scores for each of these stand-alone elements are then added 
(Note that total weight must = 1).  This then represents a score for the TJ 
(maximum value = 1) before taking into account the limiting factors discussed 
next. 
 
5.c) Limiting factors.  
 
Limiting factors are elements that can, alone, set an upper limit on the 
probability of detection. Such elements must be treated separately. 
 
A limiting factor could be coverage. For instance, it might be deduced from the 
information contained in the TJ that coverage is only 75%. This will automatically 
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 reduce the maximum attainable probability of detection to 0.75, as all defects 
located in the 25% of the volume not covered by the NDE system will be missed 
(assuming uniform distribution). 
 
Another limiting factor might be equipment. For instance, it might work 
satisfactorily only 95% of the time. Again, the maximum probability of detection 
could not be higher that this value.  
 
Limiting factors are cumulative, so that if coverage alone is responsible for 
missing 25% of defects and equipment alone is responsible for missing 5%, then 
these two factors together are responsible for missing 29% of defects 
(1-0.75·0.95) 100% compared to the situation if those two factors had been 
perfect. 
 
Let pLF be defined as the cumulative probability of missing a defect due to 
limiting factors. In the example above pLF = 29%. 
 
 
5.d) Having broken the TJ down into various stand-alone elements and limiting 
factors, they are combined as follows: 
 
1. Obtain the posterior distribution as from step 10 of point 3.a, taking into 
account stand-alone elements only. This is a Beta distribution function 
defined in the interval [0, 1], i.e. it covers the POD probability distribution 
for in the range 0% to 100%; 
 
2. Determine the cumulative probability, pLF, of missing a defect due to 
limiting factors (last paragraph of point 5.c). This expresses the fact that 
the limiting factors impose an upper limit equal to 1-pLF on the POD; 
 
3. In effect the Beta distribution applies to the reduced population of defects 
which are within the area covered, and where equipment works, etc. If for 
example, pLF=29%, the combined limiting factor, 1-pLF, is 71% and then the 
initially derived Beta distribution must be scaled so that it only covers POD 
in the range 0% to 71%. Beyond 71% it is zero. 
 
4. Figure A3 provides an illustration of the approach. The final distribution has 
the same shape as the one obtained quantifying the stand alone elements 
only, but "squeezed" between 0 and 1-pLF. Consequently, it is also scaled 
in the y-axis direction by a factor 1/pLF, so that the total area under it 
remains equal to 1. All the relevant quantities, such as mean, mode and 
percentiles are simply scaled by a factor 1-pLF. 
 
5.e) Importance of independence 
 
It is important to ensure that the various components of evidence are 
independent, whether of the stand-alone or limiting factor type.  For example the 
POD from the element “previous experience” might be only 80% specifically 
because of the limiting factor “unreliability of personnel”. Similarly results from 
modelling might already take into account restrictions in coverage. Ensuring that 
the various components of evidence are independent will avoid double 
accounting. 
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6) Weight of the TJ 
 
6.a) The "weight" of the evidence contained in a TJ as expressed by means of the 
equivalent TJ sample size, NTJ.  
 
Providing a judgement on such number can be a difficult task for the experts. 
 
The experts can be aided in this task by visualising how many practical trials 
with representative defects (of the types for which detection is to be quantified) 
they would be ready to accept if they were to "give up" the information supplied 
by the TJ in support of inspection capability in order to maintain the same 
degree of understanding in the NDE system. 
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 7) How to define one practical trial.  
 
7.a) The definition of a practical trial can be problematic. 
 
The model simply requires that each practical trial be assumed as a Bernoulli 
trial, i.e. as an independent trial whose output is either a "hit" (success) or a 
"miss" (failure). Generally components are inspected with multiple probes and 
this is simulated during practical trials. For instance, the tespiece(s) might 
contain 6 defects.  Each defect might then be inspected with 6 different probes, 
thus giving 36 defect-beam interactions. If each interaction produces a 
reportable signal, the question then arises whether the practical trials can be 
treated as 6 out of 6 hits, or 36 out of 36.  
 
It could happen that only 1 of the 6 beams produces a reportable signal when 
scanning a particular defect, and still the defect would be reported as detected. 
In this case, assuming 5 failures out of 6 trials would not be representative of the 
real NDE system capability. The correct assumption in this case would be to 
treat the case as 1 success out of 1 trial (but see also point 8.c below). 
 
It is thus recommended that the user satisfies him/herself that a single (and 
independent) practical trial is defined in a way that is truly representative of the 
situation that will happen when the NDE system is applied in practice. 
 
 
8) Weighting for special cases 
 
8.a) Worst-case defects in practical trials. 
 
When test blocks are designed, the aim is often to manufacture defects that 
represent the most difficult defects to be found. The user may decide to take 
some credit for this situation. 
 
One would expect that actually the probability of detection (e.g. of defects 
exceeding a certain size) is higher in the case where the defect population 
includes not only the most difficult defects (due to their tilt, or skew etc.), but also 
the whole range of possible defects.  
 
Thus, it could be claimed that finding 10 out of 10 test piece “worst case” defects 
actually results in higher confidence than what a statistical analysis (with the 
assumption of identical defect populations) indicates. 
 
In [Ref. 7, Section 6.3], a mathematical framework was suggested to deal in a 
rigorous way with this situation, partitioning the population of defects into two 
groups each characterised by a different probability of defects. To draw practical 
conclusions, the user would then be required to make further assumptions, for 
instance about the relative percentage of worst-case defects as opposed to the 
rest of the defect population. 
 
An alternative approach would be to simply give a higher weight to worst-case 
practical trials, for instance counting each of them as being equivalent to 
performing two trials. This decision must be taken (and justified) by the user, 
 68 
 with the full awareness that it remains based (like the rest of this approach) in 
expert judgement. 
 
 
8.b) Margin of detection. 
 
A similar line of reasoning as above can be made regarding margins of 
detection, if the user feels justified taking some credit for the fact that defects in 
test piece trials are detected with very high margins above the reporting 
threshold. 
 
 
8.c)  Number of beams. 
 
A similar line of reasoning as above can be made regarding number of beams, if 
the user feels justified taking some credit for the fact that defects in test piece 
trials are simultaneously detected by multiple beams. 
 
 
9) Worked example 
 
In this example, the qualification body is asked to quantify detection capability of an 
NDE system which is being qualified. A TJ is considered, in which a body of evidence 
supporting detection capability has been assembled. Further, 10 practical trials have 
been carried out. The NDE system has correctly found all 10 flaws. 
 
 
Step 1 – Identification of stand-alone elements and limiting factors. 
Evidence is present in the TJ from which it is concluded that coverage is limited to 
95% of the inspection volume. Further it is judged that equipment may work 
satisfactorily 99% of the time and that human factors cannot be higher than 98%. 
These three elements represent limiting factors. Three stand-alone elements are then 
identified within the TJ: (1) theoretical modelling, (2) experimental evidence and (3) 
parametric studies.  
 
 
Step 2 – Determination of cumulative probability of missing a defect due to 
limiting factors, pLF. 
 
 pLF  = (1-0.95·0.99·0.98) = 0.078  
 
In other words, the maximum probability of detection will not be higher than 1-pLF = 
92.2% 
 
 
Step 3 – Decision regarding the relative weights of the TJ stand alone elements. 
The first decision the qualification body is asked to make concerns the relative 
weights of the TJ stand alone elements. In the Technical Justification at hand, three 
main stand alone elements have been identified. After examination, the qualification 
body decides that Element 1 contributes towards 30% of the total evidence contained 
in the TJ, Element 2 is judged to carry 50% of the evidence, and Element 3 20%. 
These values are summarised in the first column of Table A1, as fractions of 1. The 
sum of these contributions must necessarily be 1.  
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Step 4 – Decision regarding the score of the TJ stand alone elements. 
The next step consists of scoring the TJ stand alone elements. It is important to 
reiterate the notion that this score must reflect how well the evidence contained in the 
TJ element supports the detectability of the prescribed defects. 
 
In the example, Elements 1 and 3 are judged to fully support the detectability of all 
defects in the specified population, and are thus both assigned a score of 100%. 
Considerations in Element 2 indicate that some limiting defects (such as worst case 
combinations of size, tilt and skew) could very occasionally be missed. Element 2 is 
thus scored with a 95%, expressing an intuitive notion that roughly 1 defect in 20 
could be missed (purely according to the evidence contained in this Element). 
 
These values are reported in the second column of Table A1, again as fraction of 1. 
 
 
Step 5 – Calculation of TJ total weighted score. 
The score of the TJ as a whole is easily obtained. For each element, the score and 
weight are multiplied and an element weighted score is obtained (third column of 
Table 6). The elements’ weighted scores are finally added together to determine the 
TJ total weighted score, wTJ. 
 
In the example (Table A1), according to the weight and evaluation given to the 
elements, the total TJ score is estimated to be 0.975.  
 
 
 
Table A1 Hypothetical data used in the example.  
 Relative weight Score Weighted score 
Element 1 0.3 1 0.3 
Element 2 0.5 0.95 0.475 
Element 3 0.2 1 .2 
 Σ = 1  Σ = 0.975= wTJ
 
 
Step 6 – Decision of the TJ equivalent sample size. 
The next decision concerns the TJ equivalent sample size, NTJ. In other words, it must 
be decided how much the technical justification is weighted as a whole. A possible 
way forward is to weight the TJ directly against the number of practical trials.  
 
10 practical trials have been performed. The qualification body proceeds by trying to 
determine how many equivalent trials the TJ is worth in comparison with this. In other 
words, the qualification body tries to decide how many additional practical trials it 
would like to add to the original 10 in order to gain the same confidence that is given 
by the evidence contained in the TJ. 
 
The qualification body is specifically asked to make an expert judgement. It thus 
needs to turn to the TJ and examine it with a critical eye. In the example, the 
qualification body analyses the TJ and realises that a lot of resources have been 
invested in assembling several pieces of evidence, all of which seem to contribute in 
building a very high confidence that all the required defects will be detected.  
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The qualification body eventually decides that just about 20 additional practical trials 
would yield the same confidence if it was asked to give up the evidence contained in 
the TJ. Thus, it is decide that:  
 
 NTJ = 20  
 
 
Step 7 – Calculation of TJ posterior parameters (TJ updating) 
The TJ total score is used to determine the equivalent number of successes, NTJs, in 
the following way: 
 
 NTJs= wTJ·NTJ  
 
The Bayesian updating process is started with a uniform prior, thus we have: 
 
 αprior = 1   βprior = 1  
 
The parameters of the Beta posterior distribution (after updating with the evidence 
provided by the TJ) are thus obtained as follows: 
 
 αTJ = 1 + NTJs  βTJ = 1 + NTJf = 1 + NTJ - NTJs  
 
The expected value and mode of the posterior distribution are (see [Ref. 7]): 
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Thus, the mode of the posterior distribution (i.e. the location where the distribution 
function attains its maximum) is equal to the TJ total score. This is appealing from an 
intuitive point of view. In the example at hand: 
 
 NTJs= wTJ·NTJs=0.975×20=19.5  
 
 αTJ = 20.5   βTJ = 1.5  
 
 E(p)=0.932 
 Mode(p)=0.975  
 
The probability density function of the TJ posterior is plotted in Figure A4 with a black 
dashed line. 
 
 
Step 8 – Updating with evidence from practical trials 
The evidence obtained from practical (open) trials can now be taken into account. 
Since: 
 
 Ntrials = 10   Ntrials,s = 10  
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 a second posterior is thus easily obtained.  
 
 αtrials = αTJ + Ntrials,s   βtrials = βTJ + Ntrials,f  
 
In the example at hand: 
 
 αtrials = 30.5   βtrials = 1.5  
 
The expected value and mode of the second posterior are: 
 
 E(p) = 0.953 
 Mode(p) = 0.983  
 
The probability density function of the second posterior is plotted in Figure A4 with a 
black dash-dot line. 
 
 
Step 9 – (optional) Updating with evidence from blind trials 
If further evidence, obtained for instance from blind trials, was available, a third 
posterior could be obtained. 
 
Let us for instance assume that the NDE system in the example at hand has been 
applied to a set of 15 blind trials. We suppose that a single defect was missed. Then: 
 
 Nblind trials = 15  Nblind trials,s = 14  
 
 
 
A third posterior is again obtained: 
 
 αblind trials = αtrials + Nblind trials,s   βtrials = βtrials + Nblind trials,f  
 
Thus 
 
 αblind trials = 44.5   βtrials = 2.5  
 
Expected value and mode of the third posterior are: 
 
 E(p) = 0.947 
 Mode(p) = 0.967  
 
The probability density function of this posterior is plotted in Figure A4 with a red 
dash-dot line. 
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Figure A4 Posterior probability densities for worked example 
 
 
Step 10 – Determination of final probability distribution (stand alone elements 
and limiting factors) 
The Beta distribution determined at Step 8 (or 9) is then applied to the reduced 
population, taking into account the reduced area covered, the equipment not always 
working, and the human factors. We had derived: 
 
 pLF  = 0.078  
 
And thus the final distribution is obtained as described at Point 5.d. Such distribution 
has the same shape as the one obtained quantifying the stand alone elements only 
(for instance, at Step 8), but "squeezed" between 0 and 1-pLF. The function is scaled 
in the y-axis direction by a factor 1/pLF, so that the total area under it remains equal to 
1, see Figure A5. 
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Figure A5 Final probability densities for worked example 
 
 
The mode of the final distribution is: 
 
 Mode(p) = (1- pLF ) 0.983 = 0.906  
 
 
Step 11 – Reporting 
As discussed in [Ref. 6], a convenient way to offer a complete summary of how the 
information available is described by the posteriors obtained in the updating process 
is by means of 1-F curves, with F the cumulative Beta distribution function. In these 
curves, plotted in Figure A6, the abscissa x represents the lower bound probability of 
detection, p, and the ordinate y represents the associated confidence level, δ. 
Therefore, the curves of Figure A6 allow obtaining directly, for any given required 
confidence level, the correspondent probability of detection.  
 
The final distribution is plotted with a solid red dot line. At a confidence level of 90%, 
the lower bound probability of detection is found to be just approximately 0.87.  
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Figure A6 1-F curves for worked example 
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Abstract 
There is a growing need for a quantitative measure of inspection effectiveness as an 
input to quantitative risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI). A Probability of 
Detection (POD) curve could provide a suitable metric. However there can be 
significant problems associated with generating realistic POD curves by practical 
trials. The ENIQ inspection qualification methodology can provide high assurance that 
an inspection system will achieve its objectives, but is not designed to provide a 
quantitative measure of the type that can be used in RI-ISI analysis. 
A project, led by Doosan Babcock, was therefore set up with main objectives to 
investigate approaches to quantifying the confidence associated with inspection 
qualification and to produce guidelines on how to relate inspection qualification 
results, risk reduction and inspection interval. 
This report discusses how a simplified POD curve, such as a step curve, could be 
used as the target for inspection qualification, or as an output from it. Work to 
investigate the sensitivity of relative risk reduction to the details of the POD curve is 
described from which it is concluded that use of a simplified POD curve could be 
justified. 
Two methods for quantifying the outcome from inspection qualification are described. 
The first method is a relatively simple process based on direct expert judgement. The 
second method is based on a more rigorous structured process employing Bayesian 
statistics, in which the subjective degree of belief in inspection capability derived from 
a Technical Justification (TJ) is expressed in probabilistic terms, and combined with 
data from practical trials results. Two pilot studies are described which involved a 
qualification body applying the quantification methods in practice. Recommendations 
for further work to make the approaches developed more robust are provided. 
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